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CONSTITUTIONAL VENUE 
Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash∗ 
Abstract 
A foundational concept of American jurisprudence is the principle 
that it is unfair to allow litigants to be haled into far away tribunals 
when the litigants and the litigation have little or nothing to do with the 
location of such courts. Historically, both personal jurisdiction and 
venue each served this purpose in related, but distinct ways. Personal 
jurisdiction is, at base, a limit on the authority of the sovereign. Venue, 
in contrast, aims to protect parties from being forced to litigate in a 
location where they would be unfairly disadvantaged. The constitutional 
boundaries of these early principles came to be tested in the first half of 
the twentieth century, as the rise of interstate commerce, transportation, 
and communication technologies prompted states to reach beyond their 
borders by expanding the jurisdictional limits of their courts through 
now familiar long-arm statutes. In International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, the Court situated the due process inquiry related to a fair 
location for trial in the personal jurisdiction doctrine—and thus 
relegated venue to its current subconstitutional status. Forcing the 
square peg of venue interests into the round hole of personal jurisdiction 
was, on a theoretical level, an odd choice from the outset. This 
theoretical foible has plagued the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence ever since. As a result, the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
cases are marked by fractured decisions with dueling opinions that 
articulate conflicting visions of the nature of the due process inquiry in 
personal jurisdiction analysis. Some Justices minimize the fairness 
inquiry because they are unable to reconcile the dissonance of 
individual rights considerations with the origins and core of personal 
jurisdiction. Other Justices elevate the fairness inquiry to the fore, as 
they see individual rights protection as critical to the due process 
analysis. Reconceptualizing the due process fair location inquiry as 
venue acknowledges the validity of both positions. Fairness in location 
has little to do with jurisdiction and everything to do with due process 
and venue. Recognition of the constitutional aspects of venue brings 
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clarity to the Supreme Court’s muddled personal jurisdiction case law. 
In addition, constitutional venue would provide a basic measure of due 
process in a small but significant category of cases—most notably 
detained deportation proceedings—where defendants are prejudiced 
when they must defend themselves in gravely unfair locations because 
of the firmly established but deeply flawed conception of venue as 
lacking constitutional content. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The most influential voices in the legal profession tell us that, in 
civil actions, venue has no constitutional dimension.1 Indeed, it is a 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 650–52 (1992) (rejecting 
unanimously a defendant’s challenge to a Montana venue statute that permitted venue in any 
county of the state in some cases, and holding that “we have no doubt that a State would act 
within its constitutional prerogatives if it were to give so much weight to the interest of plaintiffs 
as to allow them to sue in the counties of their choice under all circumstances”); 77 AM. JUR. 2D 
Venue § 2 (2006) (noting that unlike issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, 
constitutional issues do not implicate venue); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 345 (2008 rev. 9th ed. 2008) (“Unlike personal jurisdiction and subject-
matter jurisdiction, the venue of a civil action is a statutory, and not a constitutional, question, 
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basic tenet of black letter law taught in every first-year law school civil 
procedure class that venue, unlike personal jurisdiction, is a matter of 
mere statutory grace. Does this mean then that a resident of Portland, 
Maine, could be haled into court 8,000 miles away in Honolulu, Hawaii, 
to defend herself from suit no matter the hardship, impediments to a fair 
trial, or lack of connections that the defendant possesses with Hawaii? 
Surely not. A variety of legal doctrines would prevent this injustice. 
Venue statutes, in the first instance, generally require that proceedings 
be located where the controversy arose or where the defendant resides.2 
Service of process rules generally require that the person be in or near 
the location of the proceedings to be served.3 And if these mechanisms 
fail, change of venue and forum non conveniens doctrines operate to 
remedy the injustice.4 But the venue-protective elements of each of 
these doctrines are a matter of grace with no constitutional minimum, 
we are told. So what protections remain if these rules were to change to 
permit such wildly unfair venues to lie? Since the Supreme Court’s 
famous pronouncements in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,5 the 
answer has been the due process component of personal jurisdiction, as 
embodied in the minimum contacts test.6 The defendant’s lack of 
minimum contacts with the state of Hawaii would prevent the state’s 
courts from exercising personal jurisdiction. 
This constitutional backstop against unfair venues fails, however, in 
federal cases where the relevant sovereign is the United States rather 
                                                                                                                     
relating primarily to the convenience of the parties and to concerns of judicial economy.”); 14D 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3801 (4th ed. 2013) 
(“Though personal jurisdiction implicates constitutional as well as statutory concerns, venue is 
wholly a statutory matter.”); 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§ 110.01[1] (3d ed. 2013) (“[N]o constitutional rights are implicated by the venue statutes.”). On 
the other hand, venue in criminal cases does implicate constitutional concerns. See infra note 23. 
 2. See infra Subsection I.C.2.  
 3. See infra Subsection I.C.1. 
 4. See infra Subsection I.C.3. 
 5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 6. See id. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940))). Subsequent cases elaborated on the minimum contacts test and added that courts 
should consider “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,” Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), whether the defendant “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), as well as urge consideration of concepts, such as purposeful 
direction and foreseeability, see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 
(1987) (plurality opinion); id. at 118–21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). See also infra Section I.B. 
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than the state of Hawaii. The defendant, living in Maine, could hardly 
claim a lack of minimum contacts with the forum of the United States. 
Personal jurisdiction, in that circumstance, would not provide any venue 
protection—venue in Honolulu would, under current conceptions, be 
wholly constitutional. It seems absurd that the constitutional guarantee 
of due process could permit such an outcome, but because of venue’s 
current subconstitutional status, it does.  
Sadly, this absurd “hypothetical” is far from hypothetical. In the 
normal federal case, we rarely, if ever, confront the constitutional floor 
of venue because the subconstitutional mechanisms of venue statutes, 
service of process rules, and the due process component of personal 
jurisdiction all serve a venue-protective function. In a small but 
significant subset of federal cases, however, the venue-protective 
function of these subconstitutional mechanisms and the personal 
jurisdiction inquiry fail, thus exposing the constitutional floor of venue.  
The most prevalent modern example—and a focus of this Article—
occurs in the context of detained deportation cases. Federal immigration 
authorities routinely arrest immigrants, including legal residents, and 
transfer them to detention facilities in remote locations thousands of 
miles away from their homes and families to venues with which they 
have no connection whatsoever.7 In fiscal year 2009, the last year with 
publicly available comprehensive data, federal immigration authorities 
detained over 350,000 immigrants—over half of those detainees were 
subject to at least one immigration detention transfer.8 These detainees 
are not afforded traditional statutory venue protections.9 Because of the 
federal nature of the proceedings, the minimum contacts due process 
inquiry also fails to provide any venue protection.10 Thus, hundreds of 
thousands of immigrants must litigate their deportation cases in wildly 
unfair venues where they lack access to counsel, witnesses, and 
evidence necessary for their defense.11 These proceedings demonstrate 
the real human toll of the misconception of venue as subconstitutional.  
While scholars have not previously explored the immigration 
context, there is a small body of scholarship examining federal statutes 
that authorize service of process anywhere in the United States and thus 
remove the venue-protective function of the service of process rules.12 
A scholarly and legal debate has thus emerged regarding whether, in 
                                                                                                                     
 7. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1302 & 
n.10 (2011). 
 8. Huge Increase in Transfers of ICE Detainees, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS 
CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 2, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/220. 
 9. See Markowitz, supra note 7, at 1302. 
 10. See infra notes 248–250 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra Section II.B. 
 12. See infra Section II.A. 
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such circumstances, the due process personal jurisdiction inquiry can 
provide the necessary venue-protective function. Those who argue that 
it cannot point out that the forum is the United States and thus the 
minimum contacts required by the due process clause for an exercise of 
personal jurisdiction must be the defendant’s aggregate minimum 
contact with the United States.13 In response, other courts and scholars 
focus on the due process requirements of “fairness” and 
“reasonableness”—as the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction cases 
articulate—to maintain some personal jurisdiction limit on 
impermissibly unfair venues.14  
The current debate, however, is largely unsatisfying because, 
although both sides persuasively defend their positions, neither 
discredits the contrary position. Indeed, both sides are correct. In the 
personal jurisdiction inquiry, the relevant inquiry is undoubtedly 
whether a defendant has sufficient contact with the sovereign seeking to 
assert judicial authority over the defendant. It is equally true, however, 
that due process could not permit a trial to occur in a location where a 
party faces profound or insurmountable obstacles to a fair trial. This 
deadlock, which arises in case law as well as scholarship, occurs 
because judges and scholars artificially cabin the debate to the personal 
jurisdiction inquiry. By expanding this discussion to explore the 
constitutional dimensions of venue, we can move beyond the deadlock 
and gain a richer understanding of the due process components of both 
personal jurisdiction and venue.15 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See, e.g., Marilyn J. Berger, Acquiring In Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question 
Cases: Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 
285, 297–98; Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. 
REV. 85, 117, 144 (1983); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1124–25 n.6 (1966); Ronald C. 
Finke, Recent Decision, Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975), 
9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 444 (1976); Brian B. Frasch, Comment, National Contacts as a 
Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction over Aliens in Federal Question Suits, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 
686, 697–98 (1982); Elaine T. Ryan, Note, Personal Jurisdiction over Alien Corporations in 
Antitrust Actions: Toward a More Uniform Approach, 54 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 330, 347–52 
(1980); see also infra Section II.A. 
 14. See, e.g., 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1068.1 (3d ed. 2002); Gerald Abraham, Constitutional Limitations upon the 
Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520, 533–36 (1963); Kevin M. Clermont, 
Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 
411, 434–37 (1981); Stanley E. Cox, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Aggregation of Contacts: The 
Real Minimum Contacts and Federalism Questions Raised by Omni Capital, International v. 
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 42 ARK. L. REV. 211, 292 (1989); Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional 
Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6 
(1984); Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due 
Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967, 972 (1961); see also infra Section II.A. 
 15. A notable exception to this deadlock is the insightful article by Professor Clermont, 
wherein he argues that the reasonableness inquiry in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence overlaps 
 
5
Markowitz and Nash: Constitutional Venue
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1158 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
Lost in the current debate is an examination of the interrelated but 
distinct evolution of the venue and personal jurisdiction doctrines and, 
as a result, an appreciation of the way traditional venue concerns have 
been shoehorned into the personal jurisdiction doctrine. The due process 
minimum contacts inquiry of personal jurisdiction currently serves two 
distinct functions: It establishes the outer boundaries of sovereign 
authority16 and it protects parties from being haled into court in unfair 
and unreasonable locations where they would face significant 
impediments to a fair trial.17 The Supreme Court has been explicit about 
this dual function.18 The former, sovereignty-rooted function goes to the 
very heart of notions of jurisdiction and is a natural extension of the 
historic conceptions of personal jurisdiction.19 The latter function, 
however, has little to do with traditional concepts of jurisdiction and 
everything to do with the core of venue: protecting litigants against 
unfair locations for trial. International Shoe’s misconception of this 
aspect of the due process inquiry distorts personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence and leaves the current doctrine confused and frequently 
maligned.20  
                                                                                                                     
with concepts of venue. See Clermont, supra note 14, at 432, 437. Professor Clermont takes aim 
at the doctrinal confusion this overlap creates. He argues for a migration away from the 
traditional “power” inquiry of personal jurisdiction toward a new broad constitutional inquiry 
that focuses on the reasonableness of the forum district or state. Id. at 444–45. Clermont asserts 
this inquiry derives from both personal jurisdiction and venue. Id. at 437.  
While his approach is notable and indeed critical in the recognition of the constitutional 
dimensions of venue, id. at 434, 435 n.116, his prescription that “forum-reasonableness becomes 
the sole constitutional test for territorial authority to adjudicate” calls for a wholesale 
revamping—indeed scrapping—of a sovereignty-focused concept of jurisdiction, id. at 455, and 
any notion of significance in venue, id. at 450. This Article, which identifies cases in which the 
consequences of this fairness in venue inquiry can be devastating, proposes a resolution that is 
more responsive to such urgent cases while it leaves undisturbed much of our longstanding 
doctrines of jurisdiction and venue. 
 16. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 
(2011) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977)). 
 17. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 291–92. 
 19. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786–87 (2011) (plurality 
opinion).  
 20. See Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The 
Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 872–75 (2012) 
(examining the “decision paralysis” in personal jurisdiction doctrine International Shoe and its 
progeny create); Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The 
Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 554 (2012) (noting that “International 
Shoe put a variety of topics on the table for assessing the constitutionality of personal 
jurisdiction” without prescribing an order in which the myriad topics should be addressed); 
Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal 
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729 (2012) (lamenting the 
jurisprudential confusion stemming from personal jurisdiction cases over the past quarter-
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The constitutional floor of venue has remained hidden from view by 
the layers of subconstitutional venue-protective doctrines and by the 
venue-protective function of the minimum contacts test. However, as 
we demonstrate here, there are cases where those mechanisms fail and, 
when they do, the failures expose the constitutional floor of venue. This 
Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the interrelated origins 
of venue and personal jurisdiction, modern case law that incorporates 
venue considerations into the due process inquiry of personal 
jurisdiction, and subconstitutional venue-protective mechanisms that 
obscure venue’s constitutional dimensions. Part II exposes the 
constitutional floor of venue by exploring two categories of litigation—
national service of process and detained deportation cases—where 
traditional venue-protective mechanisms fail. Part III advances a 
constitutional theory of venue and discusses how the theory would both 
comport with traditional notions of due process and bring clarity to 
modern personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
Recognition of the constitutional nature of venue would be a critical 
step forward. First, it would both clarify personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence and harmonize the case law with the historic origins of 
both doctrines. Second, and more consequentially, it would ensure a 
basic measure of due process to the defendants whose cases are 
prejudiced when they must defend themselves in gravely unfair 
locations because of the flawed conception of venue as lacking 
constitutional content. 
I.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE: INTERRELATED ORIGINS 
AND EVOLUTION 
A foundational concept of American jurisprudence is the principle 
that it is unfair to allow litigants to be haled into far away tribunals 
when the litigants and the litigation have little or nothing to do with the 
location of such courts.21 Protecting litigants against such injustice is 
critical to both venue and personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. However, 
despite common concerns, venue and personal jurisdiction occupy 
distinct legal spaces and their unique characters protect fairness 
                                                                                                                     
century); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a 
Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 398–400 (2012) (describing International 
Shoe as duplicitous, with one face looking to past personal jurisdiction doctrine, and the other 
expressing a new conceptual theory); Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of 
Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2013) (arguing that the Court “has struggled to explain why 
state lines should be relevant at all in personal-jurisdiction cases” since International Shoe and 
that, post-Nicastro, the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is “even more conceptually 
muddled and practically confused than it was before”). 
 21. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
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concerns in specific ways.22 Venue, on one hand, is litigant-protective 
because it inquires into the propriety of the site of proceedings based on 
the parties’ connections to the place and obstacles to a fair proceeding.23 
Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is sovereign-constraining 
because it asks whether the sovereign has the authority over the 
parties.24 Of course, personal jurisdiction also acts to protect litigants 
but, unlike venue, it does not purport to guard against an uneven playing 
field between parties. Rather, personal jurisdiction protects litigants 
against the unfairness of being subject to the authority of a sovereign 
with which they have insufficient connections.25  
The sometimes fine distinction between the two and the common 
practical effect of both doctrines have resulted in profound confusion 
regarding the boundaries between venue and personal jurisdiction.26 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See 77 AM. JUR. 2D Venue § 2 (2006). 
 23. See Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651–52 (1992). Venue doctrine 
operates differently in criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases, venue protections provide 
defendants with the constitutional right to be tried in the district where the defendant committed 
the crime. The Constitution guarantees this right because it provides that federal criminal 
defendants be tried by “an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed,” U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and that criminal defendants are entitled to trial “in 
the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The 
Supreme Court has agreed that a criminal defendant has a right to trial in the place where the 
crime was committed and has found that the Sixth Amendment guarantees this right. See 
Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220 (1956); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 232–33 
(1924). Scholars affirm that this accords with the Framers’ intention that the Sixth Amendment 
create a right to venue as well as a right to vicinage: 
[I]f the debates in the state conventions can be taken as typical, those who 
clamored for more specific and more narrowly defined criteria of vicinage were 
frequently speaking in terms of venue, or at least they failed to distinguish 
clearly between vicinage and venue, between origin of the jury and location of 
the trial. 
See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
93 (1951). 
 24. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 
(2011) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977)). 
 25. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 26. See, e.g., Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 203 (1966) (“[A]lthough [the relevant] 
provision [of the Jones Act] is framed in jurisdictional terms, the Court has held that it refers 
only to venue.”); United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 700, 704–06 (1946) (reversing the 
district court’s erroneous determination that venue was improper and that the district court 
therefore did not have jurisdiction); Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72, 82 n.13 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(noting that Wright and Miller’s Federal Practuce & Procedure “criticize[s] judicial statements 
that ‘venue is wrong’ when referring to an absence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 
as that ‘blurs the very different concepts of venue and personal jurisdiction,’” while Moore’s 
Federal Practice says that “‘the concepts of venue and personal jurisdiction [have become] 
essentially coextensive,’ and therefore, venue can be ‘technically proper’ when ‘it complies with 
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This confusion is largely responsible both for the erroneous conception 
of venue as subconstitutional and for the muddled state of personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence. Accordingly, by examining the interrelated 
origins of both doctrines, tracing the modern constitutionalization of 
personal jurisdiction, and exploring the way that subconstitutional 
venue-protective mechanisms obscure the constitutional floor of venue, 
we begin to resolve the confusion.  
A.  Origin and Early Evolution of Personal Jurisdiction and  
Venue Doctrines  
The origins of the personal jurisdiction and venue doctrines confirm 
the distinct roles played by each. Personal jurisdiction, from the 
inception of the concept, constrained the power of the sovereign and in 
so doing, protected litigants against unfair treatment at the hands of the 
state. Venue, on the other hand, served to make justice accessible to 
litigants and to protect litigants against unfair treatment, vis-à-vis an 
opposing party who sought to gain a tactical advantage by selecting an 
inconvenient location for trial. These early concepts, established in 
common law England, were carried forward in the American judicial 
system, which emphasized from its foundation the critical virtue in 
accessible justice. During the early history of the United States, the 
constitutional boundaries of venue, however, went largely unexplored, 
first because litigation remained local and largely confined to actions in 
state courts, and later, as litigation in federal courts became increasingly 
common, because federal service of process rules effectively limited the 
range of permissible venues. 
Among the key achievements of the English common law system 
was the development of judicial mechanisms that allowed civil venue to 
be set and cases heard in locations that would avoid hardship to the 
                                                                                                                     
the applicable venue statute’ but ‘wrong’ when there is ‘some other procedural obstacle in the 
original court, such as a lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant’” (quoting 15 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3827 (3d ed. 2007); 17A MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.02); Rodriguez v. Bush, 367 F. 
Supp. 2d 765, 770 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Although Section 408(b)(3) of [the Air Transportation 
Safety and System Stabilization Act] refers to ‘exclusive jurisdiction,’ the provision is, at 
bottom, a directive that the [Southern District of New York] be the exclusive venue for the 
federal causes of action to which [the Act] applies.”); Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 
274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93–95 (D.D.C. 2003) (interpreting the same jurisdictional language from 
Rodriguez as not requiring exclusive venue in the Southern District of New York); see also 
George Neff Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. REV. 307, 
310, 316–23 (1951) (finding, in a survey of state venue and jurisdictional statutes, “inaccurate 
and misleading” conflations of jurisdiction and venue). 
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litigants and enhance the accessibility of the civil justice system.27 In 
the early English system, actions against people—rather than actions 
based on property28—could be brought in any court so long as the court 
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.29 This broad authority to 
exercise personal jurisdiction meant that, initially, litigants were 
required to travel from the furthest reaches of England to defend 
themselves before the court, then centralized in Westminster, which was 
both inconvenient and prejudicial to the parties.30  
In response to this problem, the concept of civil venue protections 
arose.31 Through an act in 1285, Parliament brought civil adjudication 
close to litigants’ homes by authorizing justices to conduct hearings of 
fact-finding, in cases of general jurisdiction, in the home counties of the 
litigants.32 Allowing cases to be heard near litigants’ homes was a 
                                                                                                                     
 27. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 
“Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 289, 297–302 (1956). 
 28. E.g., Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.) 1029; 1 Co. Rep. 161, 176 
(“[W]here the proceeding is in rem, and where the effect of the judgment cannot be had, if it is 
laid in a wrong place.”). 
 29. See Joseph Henry Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners (pt. 2), 26 HARV. 
L. REV. 283, 284–85 (1913). 
 30. See, e.g., Mostyn, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1029–30, 1 Co. Rep. at 176–77 (requiring the 
governor of Minorca, which was part of the British Empire at the time, see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 806 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), to defend himself against suit 
in London); George Burton Adams, The Origin of the English Courts of Common Law, 30 YALE 
L.J. 798, 809 nn.38–39 (1921) (indicating the courts were centralized in Westminster). 
 31. See Peter G. McAllen, Deference to the Plaintiff in Forum Non Conveniens, 13 S. ILL. 
U. L.J. 191, 199 n.17 (1989) (“Long ago, in England, there were no venue statutes, almost all 
actions were ‘local’ in nature, and the plaintiff typically had but one court to choose from. As 
courts began to recognize more and more transitory actions, legislatures began to enact statutes 
more like the modern venue statutes.”); see also Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 663 
(C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411) (“[O]riginally all actions were local. That is, that according to 
the principles of the common law, every fact must be tried by a jury of the vicinage. . . . The 
jurisdiction of the courts therefore necessarily becomes local with respect to every species of 
action.”). 
 32. Statutes of Westminster, 2d, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 30; 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *58–60 (explaining that this act authorized justices to travel to sites throughout 
the country to conduct factual hearings in local venues closest to the litigants in cases within the 
jurisdictional authority of the Westminster court). Centuries later, as the function of the common 
law jury became more adjudicative and less testimonial, vicinage requirements were relaxed. 
14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3802. Even so, English venue doctrine retained the notion 
that the case must be tried in an area related to the dispute; while the rationale for rigid vicinage 
in laying “fact-venue” receded, “cause of action venue” became the practice—and finally the 
rule—which placed venue at the county specified by the plaintiff when initially pleading the 
cause of action. See The Civil Procedure Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, § 22 (granting the 
power to judges to have local actions tried in any county). Although “cause of action venue” 
meant, practically, that the plaintiff’s notation on the complaint set the presumptive place of 
venue, “cause of action venue” nonetheless retained the notion that avoiding hardship to the 
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critical reform, motivated in part by the fact that jurors at that time 
decided cases based upon their own knowledge of the facts.33 However, 
the reform was probably likewise intended to restrict plaintiffs’ ability 
to purposefully bring suit where a defendant would be disadvantaged.34 
Trials were held locally, as opposed to centrally at the King’s 
Westminster courts, to mitigate “hardship to the parties, witnesses, and 
jurors whose attendance was necessary.”35 Moving the site of 
adjudication to the counties to allow litigants to establish facts without 
hardship to key participants, was considered one of the key 
developments during the reign of Edward I, who, in the words of the 
father of American common law,36 “perfect[ed]” the English system.37 
Accordingly, from its inception, the concept of venue was intended to 
protect parties from litigation in locations where they face an unfair 
disadvantage. 
At that time, the premise behind courts’ jurisdictional authority was 
a theory of territoriality and consent to the state’s authority38: since the 
English sovereign’s authority extended only as far as its territory and 
over its citizens, English courts could assert jurisdiction only over those 
either within the sovereign’s territory or citizens of that sovereignty.39 
In England, as now in America, a court can assert jurisdiction only over 
                                                                                                                     
defendant was key to proper venue placement and therefore change of venue was 
“compulsory . . . on a showing of the adverse party.” ALEXANDER MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT 
COMMON LAW § 30 (1905) (emphasis added). 
 33. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 120–21, 
123–24, 127–28 (Little Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929); Roger S. Foster, Place of Trial—
Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 HARV. L. REV. 41, 43 (1930). 
 34. Foster, supra note 33, at 43 (explaining that the “plaintiff’s power of determining 
venue was abused” and the “successive attempts to restrict [plaintiffs’ venue choice] indicate 
that then as now there was temptation to choose the most inconvenient place for the defendant 
whether or not it was convenient for the plaintiff”). 
 35.  MARTIN, supra note 32, § 362, at 307; see PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 29.36.
William Searle Holdsworth, Sir William Blackstone, 7 OR. L. REV. 155, 157 (1928) (“If the 
Commentaries had not been written when they were written I think it would be very much more 
doubtful whether you here [in the United States], and other English speaking countries would 
have so universally adopted our [English] common law.”). 
 36. William Searle Holdsworth, Sir William Blackstone, 7 OR. L. REV. 155, 157 (1928) 
(“If the Commentaries had not been written when they were written I think it would be very 
much more doubtful whether you here [in the United States], and other English speaking 
countries would have so universally adopted our [English] common law.”). 
 37. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23. Compare Statutes of Westminster, 
2nd, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 30 (establishing the courts of nisi prius), with 3 BLACKSTONE, supra, at 
*425 (praising how courts like the courts of nisi prius did justice by resolving disputes in even 
the most remote provinces). See generally 3 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *58–60 (discussing the 
courts of nisi prius).  
 38. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 27, at 297–98. 
 39. Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 367–68 (1874). 
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a person in a civil suit if that person receives service of process.  In the 
early period of American law, since the state’s jurisdiction extended 
only as far as its territory or over its residents, only those either within 
its territory or those who are residents of the state could be served with 
process.40 In England, a court could assert jurisdiction so long as the 
defendant was served within England’s borders.41 Accordingly, from its 
inception, personal jurisdiction was an expression of the boundaries of 
sovereign authority over litigants.  
The United States’ judicial system was informed by, but not 
replicative of, the English system of jurisdiction, venue, and process; it 
is necessarily distinct, in part because two sovereign adjudicative 
systems function simultaneously within its national boundaries. While it 
retained its English forebears’ basic relationship between courts, 
litigants, and causes of action, the American judicial system also 
reflected a deeper commitment to decentralized and accessible courts 
than its monarchical and comparatively centralized common law 
ancestor.42 An exploration of the history of these doctrines as part of the 
development of the American common law reveals the due process 
values that underlie each doctrine, shows how the materialization of this 
protection within jurisdictional requirements operated to relieve venue 
doctrine of due process constraints, and explains the resultant 
characterization of venue as statutory and convenience-focused.  
The connection between the geographic locale and the judicial 
authority of courts was fundamental to the American judicial system at 
its creation. In the pre-Independence era, each colony operated its own 
court system and, as a practical matter, functioned as an independent 
sovereign.43 When the American colonies won independence, they 
united in a federation of American states and authorized the creation of 
a federal court system.44 However, despite the creation of a coequal 
                                                                                                                     
 40. Id.  
 41. Foster, supra note 33, at 46 n.20 (explaining that a defendant could receive service of 
process anywhere within England). 
 42. Jurisdictional authority was justified as founded upon various theories of sovereign 
power, which include consent to the authority of the sovereign and territorial sovereignty, which 
generally reflect the political structure of the sovereign. See Beale, supra note 29, at 283–84, 
296–301. In feudal Europe, scholars thought a sovereign’s juridical authority derived from 
reciprocal rights between rulers and subjects, while in England, where the King’s authority 
superseded feudal authority, scholars saw jurisdiction as a matter of territorial principles. See id. 
at 283–84. Unsurprisingly, the distinct American political structure, comprised of coordinate 
sovereigns, produced an equally distinct approach to personal jurisdiction. 
 43. See William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American 
Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 401 (1968). See generally id. at 398–404 (discussing 
the early court systems of many of the American colonies). 
 44. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (6th ed. 2009) (“Article III, the judiciary article of the Constitution, emerged 
from the Convention that met in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787.”). 
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national sovereignty, American courts continued to operate, as a 
practical matter, with little change.45  
Contemporaneous accounts of the drafting of Article III, which 
authorized the creation of the federal courts, suggest that this may have 
been intentional. The Framers remembered the English monarchy’s 
control of the national courts, and as such, the protection of fair access 
to the courts for those with limited means particularly concerned them.46 
At the constitutional conventions, there was considerable debate about 
whether the creation of a nationwide judicial system was necessary at 
all, and whether such creation could be used to upset the existing system 
of locally resolved disputes.47 In these early discussions about the 
structure of the federal judiciary, state delegates opposed a federal court 
system in which litigation would “carry me a thousand miles from 
home—from my family and business—to where, perhaps, it will be 
impossible for me to prove [my case].”48 The resultant law thus 
reflected the delegates’ common view that there should be numerous 
courts arranged such that justice would be brought to every man’s 
door.49  
Pursuant to Article III’s authority, Congress established a structure 
                                                                                                                     
 45. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 
483, 489–90 (1928) (stating that state courts retain much of their original jurisdictional hold). 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 489 (noting that opponents of Article III feared the destruction of state 
judiciaries); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 638 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1966) (recording the statements of Virginia delegate George Mason). 
The Judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb 
and destroy the judiciaries of the several States; thereby rendering law as 
tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of 
the community, as in England, and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the 
poor. 
Id. 
 47. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 8, 19–20; 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., ANTECEDENTS 
AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 226 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010) (1971) (describing concerns 
about a judicial structure that “offered a tempting means of extending [federal] jurisdiction” and 
noting that “[t]he delegates were too familiar with the British constitution not to know that it 
was at the level of original jurisdiction that the three central courts at Westminster had each 
extended its authority”); Fullerton, supra note 14, at 33 (describing the fear some delegates 
expressed to the Constitutional Convention of “the power that would accrue to a system of 
federal courts with authority to serve process throughout the country”). 
 48. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 
1787, at 526 (Jonathan Elliot ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2d ed. 1996) (1891) (statement of 
Virginia delegate George Mason); see also 4 id. at 136 (statement of North Carolina delegate 
Judge Samuel Spencer) (discussing the oppression and interference that would be caused by 
parties having to travel to distant federal courts). 
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for the federal court system through the Judiciary Act of 1789.50 In 
response to the Framers’ concerns that plaintiffs could hale people in to 
court far from home, this Act created a federal judicial structure that 
retained the system of geographically localized courts: federal districts 
were established along state lines and those districts were grouped into 
circuits, which were granted appellate jurisdiction.51 Thus, district 
courts were authorized to hear discrete categories of suits that arose 
within their geographical districts.52 Moreover, the Act granted federal 
defendants the right to defend themselves in civil actions at the place of 
their residence or where they were physically present.53 However, the 
                                                                                                                     
 50. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 21; cf. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial 
Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500–01 (1928) 
(discussing the difficulties Congress faced in creating the federal judiciary). 
 51. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2–4, 1 Stat. 73, 73–75; FALLON ET AL., supra 
note 44, at 21–22 & n.6 (noting that this Act authorized additional circuit courts to sit in the 
remote districts of Kentucky and Maine, as opposed to requiring appellants in those faraway 
districts to travel to one of the three main circuits). The rationale for this structure was rooted in 
due process concerns: 
Members of the founding generation were concerned that a national court 
system would subject citizens to suit in distant locales at great inconvenience 
and in violation of a perceived entitlement to localized justice. Responding to 
this concern, the First Congress, via the Judiciary Act of 1789, limited effective 
service to that issued by the district in which the defendant resided or the 
district in which the defendant was actually present when served. 
A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 325, 326 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in 
Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1594 (1992); Jamelle C. Sharpe, Beyond 
Borders: Disassembling the State-Based Model of Federal Forum Fairness, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2897, 2903 & n.17 (2009). 
 52. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 21–22; 1 GOEBEL, supra note 47, at 462 & n.19; 
see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A 
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 11–12 (1927). 
 53. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11(b), 1 Stat. 73, 79 (“[N]o civil suit shall be brought 
before either [district or circuit] courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original 
process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found 
at the time of serving the writ . . . .”). This provision, the first relating to venue, remained 
essentially unchanged until 1875. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 
706, 708–09 (1972). Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1, 7–8, 18 Stat. 470, 470, 472–
73 (granting federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over all matters arising under federal law, 
subject to a $500 amount-in-controversy requirement), and REV. STAT. § 739 (1878) (codifying 
§ 11(b) of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and indicating two session laws before the Act of March 3, 
1875 affecting the section), with Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 13, 17 Stat. 196, 198 (allowing 
juridiction in rem even if defendants fail to appear), and Act of May 4, 1858, ch. 27, §§ 1–2, 11 
Stat. 272, 272 (allowing a plaintiff to sue multiple defendants in different districts if they were 
all in the same state, and clarifying venue for land that lies across a district boundary within a 
state). 
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Act authorized federal courts to hear only a limited category of cases, 
and so state courts remained the primary forum for the vast majority of 
disputes.54 By and large, disputes were resolved locally, so litigants 
were not likely to be haled into courts far away from their homes.55  
The basics of American common law actions resembled those in the 
English system. In order for a state court to have personal jurisdiction—
authority to exert control over the person—the defendant had to be a 
resident of the state,56 physically within the territory of the state,57 or 
had to have voluntarily consented to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
state.58 In the early years—and indeed the greater part of U.S. history—
the American common law system mirrored that of its English ancestor 
                                                                                                                     
 54. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 744 (explaining that, in the antebellum period, 
which was prior to the grant of “federal question” jurisdiction, parties had to turn to state courts 
even for adjudication of federal claims, except in the relatively limited number of diversity 
suits). 
 55. See Foster, supra note 33, at 46–47 (describing state venue rules and finding that“[i]n 
almost every state there is some check which would prevent the plaintiff from selecting a remote 
county merely to embarrass the defendant” or inconvenience parties or witnesses); id. at 47 
n.21, 62 app. (finding that, as of 1930, almost every state set venue presumptively where the 
defendant resided or where the cause of action arose and, even in change of venue 
determinations, thirty-two of the state venue rules evinced a “tendency to give defendant rather 
than plaintiff the advantage of trial at his home”). 
 56. E.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1940).  
 57. Mason v. Connors, 129 F. 831, 833 (C.C.D. Vt. 1904) (holding that service during a 
defendant’s physical presence in the state conferred personal jurisdiction); see McDonald v. 
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91–92 (1917) (holding state court assertion of personal jurisdiction 
improper where service of process upon the defendant, after he had moved out of the state and 
was only attempted by publication). The physical presence basis for personal jurisdiction 
contemplates a voluntary physical presence; this basis does not apply where a person’s physical 
presence is acquired through fraud or coercion. Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 
U.S. 245, 256 (1909) (“It is undoubtedly true that if a person is induced by artifice or fraud to 
come within the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of procuring service of process, such 
fraudulent abuse of the writ will be set aside upon proper showing.” (citing Fitzgerald & 
Mallory Constr. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U.S. 98 (1890))); Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, 
314–15 (2d Cir. 1937) (invalidating personal service where the plaintiff lied to the defendant to 
induce him to come to the state in order to be personally served); Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 F. 
700, 703 (2d Cir. 1917) (reversing judgment in a case initiated by “fraudulent service”); Toof v. 
Foley, 54 N.W. 59, 60 (Iowa 1893) (holding that the case clearly fell within the rule that “if a 
person residing in one jurisdiction be induced, under false pretenses or representations, to come 
into another, for the purpose of there getting service upon him, the jurisdiction thus acquired 
will be held to have been fraudulently obtained, and the judgment is void”); Comment, 
Jurisdiction over Persons Brought into a State by Force or Fraud, 39 YALE L.J. 889, 894–96 
(1930). 
 58. See, e.g., McDonald, 243 U.S. at 91 (“[S]ubmission to the jurisdiction by appearance 
may take the place of service upon the person.”). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (providing 
for waiver of lack of personal jurisdiction), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court 
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 
action.”). 
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in this respect: service of process could be effectuated only upon a 
person within the court’s territorial domain.59 The territorial bounds of 
federal district courts generally connected to the states from which they 
derived their authority;60 this sphere of control encompasses territory as 
well as inhabitants.61 Under this conception of territorial jurisdiction, 
residents of a state are subject to its judicial authority and, as such, may 
be served with process even when they are beyond its physical 
borders.62 Because, as in early England, personal jurisdiction limits 
were strict and effectively acted to prohibit unfair venue, there was little 
need for litigants to rely on the venue doctrine—and thus few 
challenges to venue on constitutional grounds occurred during this early 
period. 
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, litigable 
disputes increasingly crossed state lines, and the federal court system 
expanded to respond to changes in social and political needs; as a 
consequence, traditional state-based jurisdiction no longer sufficed to 
ensure parties a fair forum for justiciable controversies.63 Accordingly, 
principles of jurisdiction, venue, and process were modified to protect 
due process by ensuring that the defendant, cause of action, and 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878) (explaining that, for a court to hear a 
personal liability action, the defendant “must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of 
process within the State, or his voluntary appearance”), abrogated by Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); 1 GOEBEL, 
supra note 47, at 226 (explaining that, within each state at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution, service of process could be issued only within the state’s borders); see also 
Comment, supra note 57, at 894–95. 
 60. The Judiciary Act of 1789 itself did not provide the specific means by which process 
was to be served but, pursuant to the Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94, and the 
Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276, federal courts initially utilized the modes of 
service employed by the states in which they sat. The Court in Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 
Pet.) 300 (1838), interpreted the Judiciary Act of 1789 to prohibit federal service of process 
under the Process Acts if it issued beyond the limits of the district in which the federal court sat, 
even if the state permitted its courts to issue extraterritorial service in certain cases. Id. at 328. 
 61. 1 BURR W. JONES & L. HORWITZ, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL 
CASES § 33, at 185 & n.55 (1913). Initially, district courts were constrained by the territorial 
limits of the district in which it sat, but the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
expanded these limits that go to the borders of the states in which the court sits, and provides 
that, in general, district courts may invoke jurisdiction based on the rules of the forum state. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
 62. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1940); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial 
Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 402–03 (1985). 
 63. See 5 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Annual Message to Congress, in THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 41–42 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (warning that “the country generally has 
outgrown [its] present judicial system”); RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 12 (2d ed. 1994) (attributing this to 
increased commercial activity and post-Reconstruction legislation, among other causes).  
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adjudicating sovereign were connected.64 Although the federal court 
system has existed almost as long as America itself, it was not until the 
late nineteenth century that federal courts became a forum for a 
significant amount of litigation.65 After industrialization and the 
concomitant social and political developments, the American judicial 
system, once a collection of independent common law systems united by 
compact,66 required adjustment to accommodate a more unified national 
character and cross-country litigation that arose from interstate commerce 
and disputes.67 During this period, the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
federal courts expanded dramatically through, inter alia, the enactment of 
civil rights and removal statutes, expanded habeas jurisdiction, and most 
significantly, the creation of federal question jurisdiction.68 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Cf. WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 63, at 12, 16 (describing the effects of the 
expansion in jurisdiction to include federal courts’ new role as “protectors of constitutional and 
statutory rights and liberties”). 
 65. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 744–45 (explaining that federal courts were 
“flooded with litigation” after Congress greatly expanded federal jurisdiction in the post-Civil 
War era, as it created civil rights causes of action, allowed for removal of state court cases, and 
authorized general jurisdiction over suits arising under federal law); see also Frankfurter, supra 
note 50, at 501–02 (describing both the legislation by which Congress allocated authority to 
federal courts during that time and the political context that prompted this shift). See generally 
WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 63, at 6–9 (describing the initial compromises underlying the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 that restricted litigation in federal courts and the subsequent expansion of 
the federal case load in the mid-1800s). 
 66. Pre-industrialization, the majority of adjudication—and jurisdiction—was then, as it is 
now, found in state courts. FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 744. Estimates have shown that 
state courts handle over 98% of filed civil cases. Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation 
Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 6 (1986). More recent data on both civil and criminal cases show 
that the figure is more than 99%. The National Center for State Courts reported that about 39.4 
million combined civil and criminal cases were filed in state courts in 2010. COURT STATISTICS 
PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT 
CASELOADS 3 (2012). In contrast, in 2010, U.S. district courts’ combined filings of civil and 
criminal cases reached 361,323 and the combined U.S. courts of appeals reported 55,592 filings 
total. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 12 (2011). 
 67. As argued by Professor Philip Kurland: 
The rapid development of transportation and communication in this country 
demanded a revision of Johnson’s “eternal principles” incorporated by Field in 
the Due Process Clause: “eternal principles” which were appropriate for the age 
of the “horse and buggy” or even for the age of the “iron horse” could not serve 
the era of the airplane, the radio, and the telephone. 
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam 
Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 573 
(1958) (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 U.S. 235, 251, 260 (1958)); see also Friendly, supra note 45, at 510. 
 68. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Inquiry: Transforming the Meaning 
of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 970 (tracing the expansion of federal jurisdiction and 
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As a result of these changes, distinctions between jurisdiction and 
venue sharpened and assumed increasing importance. These statutory 
changes, along with the significant growth in American business, 
greatly increased the numbers of parties before and cases in federal 
courts.69 The federal venue provision, however, remained 
“undisturbed,” and maintained its defendant-protective requirement that 
venue be set either where a defendant resides or where “he shall be 
found.”70 Thus, as litigants increasingly utilized the sprawling federal 
court system for litigation of all types, statutory venue protections 
generally protected defendants from being sued in an inconvenient 
forum and therefore constitutional questions about venue did not arise. 
Personal jurisdiction and service of process rules also played a key 
role in the restriction on the location of trial amid geographically 
expansive litigation. It was during this period that the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) were first established.71 Those rules carried 
forward traditional protections that preserved the notions of proximity 
and fairness to defendants:72 under the FRCP, personal jurisdiction was 
acquired in the same way as before, through proper service of process 
                                                                                                                     
differentiation of the federal court system during this era); FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 28–
29. The Judiciary Act of 1875 established general jurisdiction over all civil cases that arose 
under federal law (subject to an amount in controversy requirement), which meant that the lower 
federal courts became the site of a significant amount of litigation. Id. at 28; Paul D. Carrington, 
Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 738 (1988) 
(“[T]he creation of a federal question jurisdiction in 1875 and the sweep of federal substantive 
policy created by Congress in the ensuing decades thrust the federal courts into the role of 
federal law enforcers . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 69. FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 745; WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 63, at 12, 
16; Friendly, supra note 45, at 510. Moreover, “[l]atitudinarian construction of this Act by the 
Supreme Court opened still wider the sluices of Federal litigation.” Frankfurter, supra note 50, 
at 509 (referring to the Act of March 3, 1875 granting general federal question jurisdiction). 
 70. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11(b), 1 Stat. 73, 779; Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Venue 
and Service of Process in the Federal Courts—Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608, 
609–10 (1954) (noting that “the venue provision was left undisturbed” after Congress revised 
the Judiciary Act in 1875); see also Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 
U.S. 706, 709 (1972) (citing In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893)) (noting that while Congress 
“greatly expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction” by “substantially revis[ing] the Judiciary 
Act” in 1875, the change to the original venue provisions “was stylistic and not substantive”). 
 71. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)) (authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure); FED. 
R. CIV. P. hist. n. (noting the original rules became effective September 16, 1938). 
 72. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3) (providing defendants with the ground of “improper 
venue” as a basis for dismissal); id. 19(a)(3) (authorizing joinder generally but requiring 
dismissal of a joined party where the “joined party objects to venue and the joinder would make 
venue improper”). 
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and an exercise of jurisdiction that comported with due process.73 Thus, 
the FRCP authorized a district court to exercise federal jurisdiction over 
persons served within the district court’s geographic area and, when 
litigants were haled into federal court, they remained entitled to be sued 
in a forum near their place of residence or in a place where they 
purposefully went.74 In this way, the service of process rules, the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction, and venue operated together to ensure 
that due process protections remained robust within the changing and 
geographically expansive judicial system. 
As the boundaries of federal personal jurisdiction expanded in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the geographic location of 
the trial—a question of venue—became increasingly important. 
However, until the 1930s, federal service of process rules constrained 
the geographic reach of federal courts75 and made it largely unnecessary 
to explore the constitutional boundaries of venue in the federal system.76 
However, industrialization and technological advancements easing 
transportation and commerce continued to prompt increasing interstate 
litigation.77 In response, states began to expand the jurisdictional reach 
of their courts through novel jurisdictional long-arm statutes.78 It was 
the advent of these statutes that set the stage for the modern 
constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                     
 73. See, e.g., Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1987) 
(holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of ineffective service of process), 
superseded by FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k); Matthews v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 60 F.R.D. 212, 217 (C.D. 
Cal. 1973) (finding no jurisdiction over the IRS Director of Utah without service in California 
because Rule 4(f) set the territorial limits of the court’s jurisdiction to the boundaries of 
California). 
 74. The Supreme Court explained the relationship between jurisdiction and venue as 
follows: 
The court had jurisdiction over the parties if the petitioner was properly brought 
before the court by the service of process within the southern district. And it 
could rightly exercise its jurisdiction, notwithstanding petitioner’s motion, 
unless there was want of venue. Venue in the present case is controlled by § 51 
of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. [§] 112, which provides, with exceptions not 
now material, that “where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the 
action is between citizens of different States, suits shall be brought only in the 
district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant . . .” 
Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 441 (1946) (ellipsis in original). 
 75. In addition to statutory protections, the doctrine of forum non conveniens protected 
defendants during the first half of the twentieth century. See infra Subsection I.C.3.  
 76. See infra Subsection I.C.1 (describing the venue-protective function of service of 
process rules); see also Ehrenzweig, supra note 27, at 292 (describing development of the 
“doctrine of the inconvenient forum” as a defendant-protective measure). 
 77. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text. 
 78. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Modern Constitutionalization of Personal Jurisdiction: 
Competing Visions of Due Process 
Prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, questions 
about the permissible reach of state courts over nonresident defendants 
arose most frequently where the courts of the defendants’ home states 
were called upon to enforce a sister state’s judgment.79 The analyses in 
these decisions focused on international comity doctrines, which were 
deemed to be an exception to the Constitution’s full faith and credit 
requirement.80 However, within a decade of the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,81 the Supreme Court famously declared in 
Pennoyer v. Neff82 that “proceedings in a court . . . to determine the 
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no 
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”83 With this 
pronouncement, the constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence began. 
It was not until the middle of the twentieth century, however, that the 
full constitutional boundaries of personal jurisdiction would be tested. 
Technological advancements in communication and transportation and 
the concomitant rise of interstate commerce increased the volume and 
frequency of interstate disputes, and states responded by expanding the 
jurisdictional reach of their courts over nonresidents through a wave of 
now familiar long-arm statutes.84 From International Shoe through the 
Court’s most recent pronouncement in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro,85 the Supreme Court has grappled time and again with the due 
process limits on personal jurisdiction. This history has been told and 
retold on many occasions,86 and a general recounting herein would not 
                                                                                                                     
 79. See, e.g., D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 175–76 (1851); Boswell’s 
Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 350 (1850); Evans ex rel. Bell v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273, 
274–75 (1835); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447, 449–50 (Pa. 1844); see also Fullerton, 
supra note 14, at 8 n.22; Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal 
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1123–24 (1981). 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Redish, supra note 79, at 1123–24. 
 81. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. 
 82. 95 U.S. 714 (1878), abrogated by Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), 
and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 83. Id. at 733.  
 84. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (plurality opinion); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–94 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 186, 202 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958); McGee v. Int’l Life 
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957). 
 85. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 86. See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over 
Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 8–28 (2006); Redish, supra note 79, 
at 1115–20. 
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significantly advance the discourse. However, one aspect of this 
jurisprudence requires special attention: the treatment of traditional 
venue interests in the constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction. 
Collectively, these cases show the Court struggling with two distinct, 
and sometimes competing, notions of the due process interest related to 
personal jurisdiction.87 One notion, embodied most significantly in 
International Shoe, Shaffer v. Heitner,88 and Insurance Corp. of Ireland 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,89 is that the central due process 
limit on permissible personal jurisdiction is based on notions of fairness 
to the defendant—protection against being haled into court in a far-off 
forum, which may significantly burden the defendant and ultimately 
prejudice the defendant’s ability to mount a defense.90 A second set of 
decisions, notably the Court’s decision in Pennoyer, Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court,91 and Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, describe the central due 
process inquiry as focused not on the rights of the defendants but on the 
permissible scope of sovereign authority.92 Other cases, notably World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,93 Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz,94 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,95 credit 
both due process interests and conduct two distinct due process 
inquiries in assessing personal jurisdiction.96 The due process interest 
that focuses on the fairness of the forum location to the defendant 
connects quite closely with the interests traditional venue doctrines 
serve. Accordingly, to understand the constitutional dimensions of 
venue, it is critical to tease out the role of this interest in Supreme Court 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Howard M. Erichson, Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question 
Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1989) (discussing the “two basic and often 
conflicting values underlying personal jurisdiction analysis: sovereignty and convenience”); 
Clermont, supra note 14, at 413–24 (discussing the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction due 
process analysis since Pennoyer). 
 88. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 89. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
 90. See id. at 702–03; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 203 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
 91. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 92. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2783 (2011); Burnham, 495 
U.S. at 609–11; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1878), abrogated by Int’l Shoe, 326 
U.S. 310, and Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186. 
 93. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 94. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 95. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 96. See id. at 108–09; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471–77; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 
U.S. at 291–92. 
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The discourse around these competing notions of due process 
emerged in the seminal International Shoe decision. The decision 
pertained to an effort by the state of Washington to recover 
contributions from a Delaware corporation for Washington’s 
unemployment compensation fund. The corporation had several 
salesmen who operated in the state and received commissions for sales 
there but the corporation did not maintain an office in Washington nor 
did it have any contracts for sale or purchase in the state.97 Noting the 
move away from the traditional presence requirement for personal 
jurisdiction, the Court famously held that “due process requires . . . [that 
a defendant outside the forum] have certain minimum contacts with it 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.’”98 In its announcement of the 
“minimum contacts” due process requirement, the Court focused almost 
exclusively on the protection of defendants against any 
“unreasonable . . . burden” rather than on limitations of the power and 
reach of the sovereign forum.99 The Court instructed that the inquiry 
should focus on whether the foreign defendants had 
such contacts . . . with the state of the forum as make it 
reasonable, in the context of our federal system of 
government, to require the [defendant] to defend the 
particular suit which is brought there. An “estimate of the 
inconveniences” which would result to the [defendant] 
from a trial away from its “home” or principal place of 
business is relevant in this connection.100  
The decision of the Supreme Court to tether this due process interest 
in a fair location to the personal jurisdiction doctrine was a rather odd 
choice. Jurisdiction, at that time and for centuries before, was 
understood as a limitation on the power of the sovereign rather than as a 
right of the individual against government.101 It is tempting to see the 
                                                                                                                     
 97. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311–15.  
 98. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 99. See id. at 317 (“To require the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit 
away from its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been 
thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due 
process.”). 
 100. Id. (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)). 
 101. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878), abrogated by Int’l Shoe, 326 
U.S. 310, and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the 
Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 32 (1990); Parrish, supra note 86, at 8–10; A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 618 (2006); see also 
supra Section I.A. 
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distinction as one of just taxonomy—every right inherent in the 
Constitution carries with it a corollary limitation on the power of the 
government. However, as discussed infra in Part II, the distinction 
between viewing the due process interest as a defendant-protective right 
or as a limitation on sovereign authority has real consequences. The odd 
squeeze of the square-peg rights framework in the round-hole 
jurisdiction concept, while a matter of mere taxonomy in most civil 
cases, has significant consequences in a select set of circumstances 
where jurisdiction is satisfied notwithstanding grave unfairness in the 
location of the tribunal.102 
In the decades that followed International Shoe’s formulation of the 
due process interest in personal jurisdiction, the Court confronted and 
acknowledged the sharp break from previous notions of personal 
jurisdiction. In Hanson v. Denckla,103 the Court sought to reassert a 
traditional conception of jurisdiction. The Court tried to recast the 
“minimum contacts” test in terms of those traditional concepts, 
asserting that: 
restrictions [on personal jurisdiction] are more than a 
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant 
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations 
on the power of the respective States. However minimal the 
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may 
not be called upon to do so unless he has had the “minimal 
contacts” with that State that are a prerequisite to its 
exercise of power over him.104 
But the language and reasoning of International Shoe was too plain 
to ignore and, in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court explicitly acknowledged 
this evolution of the Court’s concept of the due process interest in 
personal jurisdiction and the break with precedent. Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, writing for the Court, explained that Pennoyer, wherein the 
Court originally found a due process interest in personal jurisdiction, 
was concerned with “exceed[ing] the inherent limits of the State’s 
power” and thus “the Court focused on the territorial limits of the 
States’ judicial powers.”105 But after International Shoe, Justice 
Marshall explained, the “central concern” in the due process inquiry 
was “notions of fair play and substantial justice” and whether it was 
“reasonable” to require a defendant to defend against suit in the forum 
                                                                                                                     
 102. See infra Part II. 
 103. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 104. Id. at 251 (emphasis added) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). 
 105. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 197. 
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jurisdiction.106 “Thus, the relationship among the defendant, the forum, 
and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the 
states on which the rules of Pennoyer rest[ed], became the central 
concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”107  
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court attempted to reconcile the two 
competing conceptions of due process. The Court laid bare the 
dichotomy and credited both conceptions of due process:  
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to 
perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. [First, 
i]t protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in 
a distant or inconvenient forum. [Second,] it acts to ensure 
that the States, through their courts, do not reach out 
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as 
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.108 
The Court purported to give primacy to the former interest: “[T]he 
burden on the defendant [is] always a primary concern.”109 However, 
the Court’s analysis focused primarily on the latter interest and on 
whether the defendant “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State”110 such that the “forum 
State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it 
asserts personal jurisdiction” over the defendant.111  
But the instability in the Court’s conception of the due process 
interest in personal jurisdiction was on full display as, a mere two years 
later in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, the Court all but disavowed the idea 
that the Due Process Clause protects traditional notions of limitations on 
sovereign power. Justice White, writing for eight Justices, held that 
“[t]he personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an 
individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power 
                                                                                                                     
 106. Id. at 203 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
accord id. (“Mr. Chief Justice Stone’s [International Shoe] opinion . . . began its analysis of [the 
personal jurisdiction] question by noting that the historical basis of in personam jurisdiction was 
a court’s power over the defendant’s person. That power, however, was no longer the central 
concern . . . .”). 
 107. Id. at 204. 
 108. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980). 
 109. Id. at 292. 
 110. Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 111. Id. at 297–98. See generally id. at 292–99 (discussing the historical shift in the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, and the Court’s continued emphasis—despite this shift—on 
the limitations of state power). 
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not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”112 
An incredulous Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, explained 
that “[f]or the first time[, the Court] defines personal jurisdiction solely 
by reference to abstract notions of fair play.”113 It is notable how far the 
Court had moved at this point from a traditional conception of the 
power of the courts defined by jurisdiction toward a conception much 
more aligned with the interests at issue in traditional venue doctrine.  
Insurance Corp. of Ireland represents the high-water mark in the 
Court’s jurisprudence for this conception of the personal jurisdiction 
due process interest. But what can explain the apparent sharp break 
from World-Wide Volkswagen’s dual vision of the nature of the due 
process interest? The question becomes even more puzzling when we 
recognize that, in addition to the temporal proximity, Justice White 
authored both opinions, and both garnered votes by largely the same 
Justices.114 The answer, it appears, can be found in the Court’s emphasis 
on the fact that Insurance Corp. of Ireland arose in a federal, not state, 
court.115 Justice White explicitly acknowledges the break with 
precedent: “It is true that we have stated that the requirement of 
personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects an element of 
federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-à-vis other states. 
For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen . . . .”116 Thus, as applied to 
the federal courts, the Supreme Court appeared to view the sole due 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) 
(emphasis added). Attempting to reconcile its decision with the decision two years previous in 
World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court explained: 
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty 
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of 
the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of 
federalism concerns. 
Id. at 703 n.10. Thus, the Court cast any due process restriction on sovereign power not as a due 
process interest itself but rather as the flip side, a mere byproduct of the individual defendant-
protective right. 
 113. Id. at 714 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 114. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Rehnquist and Stevens joined Justice White’s opinions 
in both cases. While Justice Powell fully joined Justice White’s World-Wide Volkswagen 
opinion, he only concurred in the judgment of Insurance Corp. of Ireland. Justice Stewart fully 
joined Justice White’s World-Wide Volkwagen opinion, while Justice O’Connor, his successor, 
fully joined the Insurance Corp. of Ireland opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, 
who had dissented from World-Wide Volkswagen, fully joined Justice White’s Insurance Corp. 
of Ireland opinion.  
 115. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 701. 
 116. Id. at 702 n.10 (emphasis added). 
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process interest personal jurisdiction inquiry as focused on venue-type 
fairness to the defendant.  
In Burger King and Asahi, the Court reasserted the dual due process 
inquiry of World-Wide Volkswagen.117 The Asahi decision is notable, 
however, for the conversation between the Justices regarding the nature 
of the due process interest at issue. The Court, with the exception of 
Justice Scalia, unanimously agreed with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
conclusion that the California court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the 
Japanese corporate defendant offended “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice,” and thus was unreasonable because of, inter 
alia, the great distance it must travel, its unfamiliarity with the legal 
system, and the availability of a less burdensome appropriate alternative 
forum.118 However, notwithstanding this agreement, the case triggered 
two competing decisions—Justice O’Connor’s and Justice William 
Brennan’s decisions each garnered four votes in relevant part and 
presented dueling conceptions of the due process limits on sovereign 
authority.119 As Justice Kennedy later described the two opinions, 
Justice Brennan “discarded the central concept of sovereign authority in 
favor of fairness and foreseeability” considerations120 while Justice 
O’Connor focused on purposeful availment, which required that 
“minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant 
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”121 This crack 
foreshadowed the divergent conceptions of the due process interest in 
personal jurisdiction that different factions of the Court would hold and 
that would, from Asahi onward through the present, prevent the Court 
from delivering a majority opinion that articulates the nature of the 
relevant due process interest.122  
                                                                                                                     
 117. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471–73. However, in Burger King—which, like 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, was a federal case, id. at 468—the Court continued to characterize 
the restriction on state power as a byproduct of the individual rights that flowed from due 
process. See id. at 472 n.13 (“Although this protection operates to restrict state power, it ‘must 
be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process 
Clause’ rather than as a function ‘of federalism concerns.’” (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. 
at 702 n.10)). 
 118. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 119. Compare id. at 108–13 (O’Connor, J.), with id. at 116–21 (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens was the only one not to join either 
position, as he preferred to dispose of the case on other grounds. Id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 120. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (Kennedy, J.) 
(plurality opinion). 
 121. Id. (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J.) (plurality)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 122. Justice Brennan’s decision provides an example of how the different conceptions of 
the due process interest (as an individual right or as a limitation on sovereignty) could, in some 
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The crack, which was born in Asahi, grew into a fissure in Burnham. 
Again, the Court was unanimous as to the result and held that the 
transient jurisdiction rule as applied in this case did not violate due 
process. The decision permitted jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding 
over the nonresident defendant spouse based upon personal service 
upon him during his brief trip to the forum state of California.123 Justice 
Scalia, writing for three members of the Court,124 rejected the notion 
that any assessment of minimum contacts, reasonableness, fairness, or 
inconvenience to the defendant is relevant to the due process analysis 
where a defendant, even a transitory defendant, is personally served in 
the forum jurisdiction. For Justice Scalia, personal jurisdiction is all 
about the limits on a sovereign’s authority.125 In his view, since state 
court authority over transitory defendants was firmly established at the 
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,126 there is no need 
at all for a minimum contacts analysis in such situations.127 
International Shoe, according to Justice Scalia, developed the minimum 
contacts test only to define the limits of novel assertions of a state 
court’s reach.128 Justice Brennan, in contrast, viewed the due process 
inquiry as focused, in all instances, on the notions of “fair play and 
substantial justice” announced in International Shoe.129 After Burnham, 
it would take two decades before the Court attempted to clarify the 
nature of the due process interest in personal jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                                     
cases, be more than opposite sides of the same coin, but rather could determine the outcome of 
the analysis. As Justice Brennan explained, “This is one of those rare cases in which minimum 
requirements inherent in the concept of fair play and substantial justice . . . defeat the 
reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum 
activities.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 123. Compare Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607–08 (1990) (discussing the 
facts of the case), with id. at 628 (Scalia, J.) (plurality) (affirming the judgment), id. at 628 
(White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), id. at 604 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment), and id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 124. Id. at 606–07. A fourth Justice, Justice White, joined a portion of Justice Scalia’s 
opinion, but Justice White did not adhere to the critical portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion that 
contained his due process analysis. Id. at 606–07, 619–22. 
 125. Id. at 609. 
 126. See id. at 610–16. 
 127. See id. at 616–19. 
 128. Id. at 619. 
 129. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Justice Brennan added that “[i]n Shaffer, we stated that 
‘all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in 
International Shoe and it progeny.’” Id. at 629 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 
(1977)). 
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In 2011, the Court once again waded into these waters with two 
decisions on personal jurisdiction.130 One of those decisions, J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, brought the Court’s focus back to 
the nature of the due process personal jurisdiction inquiry. Again, the 
Court fractured and failed to issue a majority opinion. Justice 
Kennedy’s plurality opinion, for four members of the Court, is the most 
full-throated defense since the birth of the minimum contacts test of the 
idea that personal jurisdiction is “a question of authority rather than 
fairness.” He asserted that the due process inquiry should focus on 
whether the “sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to 
judgment,” not on “a rule based on general notions of fairness and 
foreseeability, [which] is inconsistent with the premises of lawful 
judicial power.”131 Five members of the Court rejected this reasoning, 
though they did not agree on an alternative.132 Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent, in response to this aspect of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, 
explained that “constitutional limits on a state court’s adjudicatory 
authority derive from considerations of due process, not state 
sovereignty” and that the “modern approach to jurisdiction over 
corporations and other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, 
gave prime place to reason and fairness.”133 
Thus, more than sixty years after the Court began to explore the due 
process boundaries of personal jurisdiction in International Shoe, it has 
yet to settle on one coherent conception of the issue. One thing that is 
clear from the Court’s jurisprudence is that there are two distinct 
potential problems that arise when a person is called into court in a 
faraway jurisdiction. One is that the forum court may exceed its 
authority beyond its sovereign powers. The other is that the defendant 
may be at an unfair disadvantage. The former concern pertains to what 
we traditionally conceive as jurisdiction, but it fits oddly into the 
                                                                                                                     
 130. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).  
 131. J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2789. Justice Kennedy did pay lip service to the idea 
that “due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful [judicial] power,” 
but concluded that the scope of the individual right is wholly determined by “whether the 
sovereign has authority [to render a judicial judgment].” Id. Thus, Justice Kennedy read the 
individual fairness protection entirely out of, or, at minimum, entirely subservient to and 
encompassed in, the issue of the scope of sovereign power. It is notable that this is the exact 
opposite of the Court’s position in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, where it read the limitation on 
sovereign power as the byproduct of the individual due process fairness protections. See supra 
notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 132. Justice Breyer’s concurrence deems Kennedy’s singular focus on the scope of 
sovereign authority as inconsistent with the “constitutional demand . . . of defendant-focused 
fairness.” J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 133. Id. at 2798, 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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individual rights due process framework. The latter, however, fits nicely 
into traditional conceptions of due process, but is awkward to conceive 
of as jurisdiction. The Court’s discomfort with these two odd fits helps 
explain this incoherent line of cases and the inability of the Court to 
come to consensus (or even to a controlling holding) regarding the 
conception of the legal issues at play.  
The “minimum contacts” test exacerbates the conceptual difficulty 
because the test is relevant to both inquiries. Whether one has sufficient 
“minimum contacts” for a court to deem one to have “purposely 
availed” oneself of the forum bears upon whether the individual submits 
to the authority of the sovereign and thus comes within the reach of its 
court’s jurisdiction. Likewise, whether one has sufficient “minimum 
contacts” bears upon whether it is fair, reasonable, and substantially just 
for a defendant to expect to face suit and mount an adequate defense in 
the location. As discussed infra in Part III, this latter inquiry is more 
appropriately described as the due process aspect of venue rather than as 
personal jurisdiction. This reconceptualization begins to bring 
coherence to the Court’s fractured jurisprudence in this realm.  
C.  The Role of Subconstitutional Venue-Protective Mechanisms 
The Court’s profound error—misplacing the constitutional inquiry 
regarding fair location in personal jurisdiction rather than in venue—has 
been largely obscured by a variety of subconstitutional mechanisms that 
operate, in the large majority of cases, to prevent us from ever reaching 
venue’s constitutional floor. Service of process rules and statutory 
venue provisions place geographic constraints on the forum of 
litigation, and mechanisms like forum non conveniens and the transfer 
provision of the Judicial Code allow courts to correct unjust or unfair 
venue. To understand why courts have been slow to recognize the 
constitutional aspect of venue, it is critical to understand how these 
mechanisms operate to obscure the issue. 
1.  Service of Process Constraints 
The federal service of process rules generally operate as a 
geographic constraint on where a party can be compelled to defend 
itself in court. Although it is well recognized that service of process 
rules are merely procedural and do not confer jurisdiction,134 these rules 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Personal jurisdiction concerns a court’s authority to “proceed to a valid judgment” in a 
given case, while service of process “provide[s] a ritual that marks the court’s assertion of 
jurisdiction over the lawsuit.” 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 1063, at 326, 328. Service 
of process rules incorporate an unrelated due process element, which requires that a plaintiff 
afford fair notice to a defendant of the commencement of an action. See infra note 265 and 
accompanying text. 
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are critical because they set forth the means by which a court can assert 
jurisdiction over a party.135 Without proper service of process, 
jurisdiction cannot be invoked.136 
FRCP 4(k) is the default rule for district courts, regardless of 
whether they are sitting in diversity or adjudicating federal claims.137 It 
provides that, in general, a district court may serve process in 
accordance with the rules of the state in which it sits; this means that it 
may issue process within the state in which it sits and only against 
parties located beyond the forum state’s borders when the state’s long-
arm jurisdictional rules permit.138 District courts may also serve process 
extraterritorially in a narrow category of other circumstances, for 
instance when the party to be served is located within 100 miles of the 
district courthouse,139 or when another federal statute specifically 
authorizes extraterritorial process.140 In this way, these rules serve, as a 
practical matter, to ensure that defendants have (or in some cases had) 
some contact with the forum of the litigation. 
2.  Statutory Venue Protection 
The entitlement to geographically proximate court proceedings—that 
is, the right to defend oneself without prejudicial burden—is most 
directly embodied in the provisions set forth in venue statutes. The 
                                                                                                                     
 135. See, e.g., Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1946) (“[S]ervice of 
summons is the procedure by which a court having venue and juridiction of the subject matter of 
the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.”), quoted in Omni Capital Int’l, 
Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553 n.5 
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (explaining that “service of process is the means by which a 
court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant”); SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 2,164 Watches, More or Less, Bearing a Registered 
Trademark of Guess?, Inc., 366 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 2004)); 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 1 
(2005) (“Any means of acquiring jurisdiction is properly denominated ‘process.’”); see also 
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917). 
 136. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943) (“[J]urisdiction of the district 
court over the person of a defendant . . . . must be acquired either by the service of process or by 
the defendant’s appearance or participation in the litigation.”); 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process §§ 3–4 
(2005). 
 137. See, e.g., Vlasak v. Rapid Collection Sys., Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1096, 1099 (N.D. Ill. 
1997) (“Service of process in both diversity and federal question cases [is] provided for 
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k).”). For information on the territorial reach of state court 
process, see 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process §§ 266–68 (2005). 
 138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); see, e.g., Noble Sec., Inc. v. MIZ Eng’g, Ltd., 611 F. 
Supp. 2d 513, 525 (E.D. Va. 2009) (noting that the first prong in a district court’s determination 
of whether it has personal jurisdiction is “whether personal jurisdiction is authorized by the 
forum state’s long-arm statute”). 
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B) (the “bulge rule”). 
 140. Id. 4(k)(1)(C); see also infra Section II.A (discussing the limited number of federal 
statutes that authorize service of process nationwide).  
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Supreme Court has explained that, unlike jurisdiction, the statutory 
venue entitlement is “not a qualification upon the power of the court to 
adjudicate, but a limitation designed for the convenience of litigants.”141 
The ability to invoke the protection of venue statutes is a “personal 
privilege of the defendant,”142 whereas a plaintiff cannot object to venue 
since the plaintiff had the initial choice of forum when the plaintiff filed 
suit.143 In this way, venue statutes operate as a safeguard against a 
plaintiff’s decision to forum shop or to use an inconvenient forum to 
prejudice a defendant.  
Venue statutes are virtually unanimous in requiring that plaintiffs 
bring civil actions in the district where a defendant resides, is present, or 
in an area related to the underlying dispute.144 The default venue for 
federal question cases is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which allows for 
a plaintiff to bring a civil action either where any defendant resides or 
where there is a connection to the substance of the claim—that is, where 
the property at issue is located or the location where the events or 
omissions that gave rise to the claim occurred.145 Some federal statutes 
provide separately for venue and, as with the federal general venue 
statute, the overwhelming majority locates litigation so as not to 
unfairly burden the defendant.146  
                                                                                                                     
 141. Olberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953). 
 142. Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 272 (1922). 
 143. Olberding, 346 U.S. at 340 (“The plaintiff, by bringing the suit in a district other than 
that authorized by the statute, relinquished his right to object to the venue. But . . . the 
defendant . . . has a right to invoke the protection which Congress has afforded him.”). 
 144. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (Supp. V 2011); ALA. CODE § 6-3-2 (Westlaw through 
the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess.); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 395 (West, Westlaw through all 2013–
14 1st Ex. Sess. laws and Res. c. 123); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.011 (West, Westlaw through ch. 
272 of the 2013 1st Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legis.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1621 (West, 
Westlaw through P.A. 2013, No. 277 of the 2013 Reg. Sess., 97th Legis.); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the 83rd 
Legis.). The small but significant exception to the Federal Rule is that the general venue statute 
does not protect any noncitizen defendant who lacks legal permanent resident status. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (Supp. V. 2011) (“[A] defendant not resident in the United States may be 
sued in any judicial district . . . .”). Prior to 2011, even legal permanent residents could not avail 
themselves of a venue defense to suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2006) (“An alien may be sued 
in any district.”); Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 
112-63, § 202, 125 Stat. 758, 763 (revising the general venue statute to provide a venue defense 
to legal permanent residents); see also Mark W. McInerney & Thaddeus E. Morgan, The 
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, MICH. B.J., May 2012, at 20, 
22, available at http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article2028.pdf; Jonathan Reich, The 
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, FED. LAW., July 2012, at 60, 
61. 
 145. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (Supp. V 2011). 
 146. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 156 (1976) (“The venue provision 
of the National Bank Act, § 94, was intended . . . ‘for the convenience of those [banking] 
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On the whole, these statutes are relatively consistent in maintaining 
the common law protection for defendants who face “inconvenience and 
harassment of participating in trial far from home, . . . assuring an 
appropriate distribution of cases among different tribunals,” and 
reducing “plaintiffs’ control over the litigation they initiate by limiting 
the courts to which they have access.”147 Because most venue statutes 
require that a suit be filed in a forum with which the defendant has or 
has had some connection, they drastically reduce the number of 
instances in which a properly venued action will result in substantial 
inconvenience to the defendant.  
3.  Venue Corrective Mechanisms 
If, notwithstanding service of process constraints and statutory venue 
protections, venue is unjust or unfairly burdensome, it can be remedied 
through common law and statutory mechanisms. These correctives—the 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens and a federal statutory 
provision that allows courts to transfer a case to another venue—
provide ways for courts to consider the convenience and the interest of 
justice that venue is meant to protect. In doing so, however, these 
mechanisms also obscure the constitutional floor of venue. 
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine under which courts 
can, as a matter of discretion, dismiss a properly venued case when the 
chosen forum is unduly inconvenient for the defendant and an alternate 
forum exists.148 This doctrine developed in response to the “very old” 
problem of “misuse of venue” wherein plaintiffs may adopt a “strategy 
of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, even 
at some inconvenience to himself,” a tactic which “affect[s] the 
                                                                                                                     
institutions, and to prevent interruption in their business that might result from their books being 
sent to distant counties . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting Mercantile Nat’l Bank v. 
Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 561 n.12 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For examples of 
state venue statutes that locate litigation in venues convenient to the defendant, see supra note 
144.  
 147. See Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 167 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 148. The Supreme Court defines the doctrine as follows:  
Under the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens, when an alternative forum 
has jurisdiction to hear a case, and when trial in the chosen forum would 
establish oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant out of all proportion to 
plaintiff’s convenience, or when the chosen forum is inappropriate because of 
considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and legal problems, the 
court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case even if 
jurisdiction and proper venue are established. 
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447–48 (1994) (alterations omitted) (quoting Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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administration of the courts as well as the rights of litigants.”149 
Essentially, this doctrine requires a court to determine whether retaining 
jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s chosen forum “best serve[s] the 
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.”150 This doctrine 
allows—in fact requires—courts to consider multiple factors that would 
affect parties’ ability to litigate the case;151 the goal is to prevent 
plaintiffs from choosing inconvenient forums to “vex, harass, or oppress 
the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to 
[the plaintiff’s] own right to pursue his remedy.”152 While forum non 
conveniens originated in state courts,153 it became widely used in 
federal courts after the expansion of the reach of personal jurisdictional 
in the wake of International Shoe.154 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); see also Williams v. Green Bay 
& W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1946) (“[Forum non conveniens] was designed as an 
‘instrument of justice.’ Maintenance of a suit away from the domicile of the defendant—
whether he be a corporation or an individual—might be vexatious or oppressive. An 
adventitious circumstance might land a case in one court when in fairness it should be tried in 
another.” (quoting Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 151 (1933) (Cardozo, J., 
dissenting))). 
 150. Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1966); see 
also Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507 (recognizing the use of “the convenience of witnesses and 
the ends of justice” as factors in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens); Iragorri v. 
United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 70–75 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (discussing the appropriate 
“degree of deference” to be “accorded” to the “plaintiff’s choice of forum” and the “assessment 
of conveniences”); Wheeler v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 108 F. Supp. 
652, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (“Since this involves the exercise of the court’s discretion, the court 
should necessarily weigh the relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial . . . .”).  
 151. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508. 
 152. Id. (citing Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American 
Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The convenience of the 
defendant is critical to the analysis, as courts must consider:  
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory 
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of 
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be 
appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a 
case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. 
Id. 
 153. Id. at 505 n.4; see also Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (stating that the 
federal Constitution does not bar state courts’ application of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens). 
 154. See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access 
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 801–02 (1985). As one scholar explains, “[w]hile the absence 
of any meaningful venue limitations on a plaintiff’s choice of forum may appear to have been 
conducive to forum shopping, thereby creating a need for further limits on choices of forum, the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens was virtually unheard of, outside of the admiralty context, 
prior to 1929. This apparent anomaly can be explained not only by a presumably smaller 
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In 1948, Congress codified this analysis by enacting § 1404(a) of the 
Judicial Code,155 which, like the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
requires “individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and 
fairness.”156 It differs, however, insofar as it allows courts to transfer a 
case to another district rather than dismissing it, in an effort “to protect 
litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience 
and expense.”157 The Supreme Court has construed this difference to 
signify that Congress meant to provide greater protection against suit in 
an unfair forum, finding that since transfer is a less harsh remedy than 
dismissal, defendants can prevail upon a lesser showing of 
inconvenience.158  
Since § 1404(a) governs in most federal cases as it usually 
preempts forum non conveniens,159 protections for defendants who face 
suit in inconvenient forums have become more robust.160 Even so, 
                                                                                                                     
number of interstate and international transactions, but also by the existence of jurisdictional 
limits far more rigid than those that exist today.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Comment, 
Forum Non Conveniens, A New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE L.J. 1234, 1234 (1947) (stating that 
expansion of personal jurisdiction, via state long-arm statutes, was countered by development of 
the forum non conveniens doctrine); cf. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 (1994) 
(noting the “murky” origins of the doctrine in Anglo-American law and that forum non 
conveniens “within federal courts . . . may have been given its earliest and most frequent 
expression in admiralty cases”). 
 155. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, sec. 1, § 1404(a), 62 Stat. 869, 937 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Supp. V 2011)) (providing for transfer of venue to 
any district where the suit “might have been brought” “[f]or the convenience of parties and 
witnesses[ and] in the interest of justice”); see also Wilshire Credit Corp. v. Barrett Capital 
Mgmt. Corp., 976 F. Supp. 174, 180 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[Section 1404(a)] is a statutory 
recognition of the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens as a facet of venue in the 
federal courts.”).  
 156. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964); see also id. at 616 (explaining that 
this provision “reflects an increased desire to have federal civil suits tried in the federal system 
at the place called for in the particular case by considerations of convenience and justice”).  
 157. Cf. Cont’l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL–585, 364 U.S. 19, 27 (1960). 
 158. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (“The harshest result of the 
application of the old doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated 
by the provision in § 1404(a) for transfer.”). In Norwood, the Court focused on that fact that 
Congress made transfer, rather than elimination, the remedy for inconvenient venue, and opined 
that “we believe that Congress, by the term ‘for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 
interest of justice,’ intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of 
inconvenience” than was required under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Id.  
 159. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996). 
 160. See Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32 (noting that a lesser showing of inconvenience will 
justify applying § 1404(a)’s transfer remedy); Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 
F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1966) (“The court’s discretion under the common law rule cannot be 
equated with its authority to transfer an action to another court of competent jurisdiction under 
[28 U.S.C.] § 1404(a) . . . . The court has a broader discretion in the application of the statute 
than in the application of the rule.”); Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach 
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forum non conveniens remains available to protect defendants who face 
suit in circumstances that the statutory transfer provision does not 
cover.161 Therefore, by operation of these safety-valve mechanisms, the 
fair play and justness concerns central to the Court’s due process 
analyses are ameliorated in the vast majority of cases without courts 
having to reach the constitutional question. 
II.  EXPOSING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR OF VENUE 
Given the layers of statutory and common law mechanisms that 
work to set venue in a fair location and to transfer venue when the 
defendant faces undue burden, it is unsurprising that the constitutional 
floor of venue is rarely visible. Yet in a small but significant subset of 
federal cases, these venue-protective mechanisms fail to varying 
degrees. Examination of such cases—specifically cases that arise under 
statutes that provide for national service of process and detained 
deportation cases—offers a rare glimpse of the full impact of venue’s 
current subconstitutional status.  
A.  National Service of Process 
In a discrete set of circumstances, Congress has supplanted general 
venue-protective service of process rules162 with statutes that permit 
process to be served anywhere in the United States.163 In cases brought 
under such statutes, the service of process rules do not provide any 
protection against an unfair location for trial.164 Because these statutes 
can “free forum selection in federal question cases from any concern 
about a defendant’s contacts with the state in which the federal court 
                                                                                                                     
Emps. of Am. v. S. Bus Lines, Inc., 172 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1949) (“Transfer is a less drastic 
matter than dismissal, for it involves no loss of time or pleading or costs; and no doubt a broader 
discretion may be exercised in ordering it.”). 
 161. For example, a motion for dismissal under forum non conveniens is available to a 
defendant in a case brought in federal court if the case cannot be transferred to another federal 
court under § 1404(a) because the more convenient forum is a non-federal forum such as a state 
court, or the court of a foreign country. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2 
(1994) (stating that forum non conveniens remains available when the alternative forum is 
located abroad); TUC Elecs., Inc. v Eagle Telephonics, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 35, 37–38 (D. Conn. 
1988) (“[E]ven if venue is properly laid in a particular federal district court, where factors of 
convenience and justice suggest that the case should proceed in a state or foreign court (i.e., a 
non-federal forum), the action may be dismissed under the common-law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.”).  
 162. See supra Subsection I.C.1. 
 163. See, e.g., infra notes 169–77 and accompanying text. 
 164. Cf. Fullerton, supra note 14, at 4–6 (discussing national service of process and 
personal jurisdiction). 
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sits,”165 courts have had to consider anew the extent to which the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits the exercise of a court’s 
jurisdiction. In such cases, however, the sovereignty-constraining 
component of the due process inquiry is clearly satisfied, at least in the 
case of a domestic defendant. But nevertheless, the burden of a distant 
location on the defendant can be great. The domestic defendant clearly 
has sufficient contact with the sovereign—the United States—but may 
be haled from, for example, Vermont to appear before a district court in 
Florida without having had the slightest contact with Florida. In this 
situation, the circuits are split on what due process requires.166 In light 
of the fractured due process jurisprudence since International Shoe and 
the competing concerns that may dictate opposite outcomes, it is an 
open question whether, when jurisdiction is invoked under a national 
service of process statute, the Fifth Amendment requires courts to 
consider the fairness of the location to the defendant, rather than just 
whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States 
such that it does not raise concerns about the nation overreaching its 
sovereign authority.167  
Congress has authorized nationwide service of process in some 
cases, as a “carefully guarded exception[]” to the otherwise localized 
service of process rules, to resolve intractable problems that prevent the 
federal judiciary from effectively remedying widespread concerns.168 
The first statute that allowed for nationwide service of process was 
enacted to allow the government to take action in a particular case—an 
interstate scandal involving public corruption.169 Since then, Congress 
has authorized nationwide service of process in a limited category of 
other circumstances where it would otherwise be difficult for a court to 
grant complete relief. For example, when Congress enacted antitrust 
legislation to combat nationwide business monopolies, Congress 
provided for nationwide service of process so that a single district court 
could exercise jurisdiction over defendants anywhere in the country if 
“the ends of justice require,”170 so that nationwide injunctions could be 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Casad, supra note 51, at 1598 (making such a remark in reference to a proposal for 
federal question national service of process). 
 166. See infra note 203. 
 167. Casad, supra note 51, at 1599–600. 
 168. Cf. Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 623–24 (1925). 
 169. See infra notes 187–92 and accompanying text.  
 170. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 5, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2012)); 
see also Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 15, 38 Stat. 730, 737 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 25 (2006)) (similarly providing for jurisdiction if the “ends of justice require” and, in addition, 
explicitly authorizing federal courts to assert jurisdiction beyond the borders of the state in 
which it sat). 
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imposed.171 Likewise, the Federal Interpleader Act of 1917172 resolved 
the difficulties that resulted from a single court’s inability to adjudicate 
insurance claims because it could not exert jurisdiction over the cases of 
multiple claimants against a single fund when some claimants lived 
beyond the borders of the forum state.173 That act allowed courts 
adjudicating interpleader actions to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over out-of-state claimants.174 Similar concerns motivated the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934175 and the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962.176  
By authorizing service of process nationwide in certain instances, 
Congress removed one of the limitations that would ordinarily constrain 
the geographical reach of a district court in those cases.177 Recall that 
                                                                                                                     
 171. See 21 CONG. REC. 2,640–41 (1890) (statement of Sen. John Spooner) (explaining 
that, under the then-existing law, a writ of injunction could “only be served and punishment for 
its disobedience enforced within the district over which the court has jurisdiction” but, under the 
proposed law, it could “be served anywhere within the United States, and if it is disobeyed the 
attachment for contempt may be served anywhere within the United States”).  
 172. Federal Impleader Act of 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929, repealed and replaced by Act of 
May 8, 1925, ch. 273, § 4, 44 Stat. 416, 417 (codified in current form at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 
1397, 2361 (2006) (allowing for national service of process to remedy problem in which 
insurance companies were faced with multiple claims on a policy in different jurisdictions and 
no single court could obtain jurisdiction over all of the parties necessary to fully resolve the 
claim). 
 173. The Federal Interpleader Act was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916), which affirmed a California 
federal court’s order that an insurance company pay a California claimant even though a 
Pennsylvania state court had already ordered the company to pay out the proceeds of the policy 
to a Pennsylvania claimant. Id. at 522–23; see H.R. REP. NO. 64-677, at 1–2 (1916); see also 
Fullerton, supra note 14 ,at 65–66. 
 174. H.R. REP. NO. 64-677, at 1–2 (1916). 
 175. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 27, 48 Stat. 881, 903 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006)); see Fullerton, supra note 14, at 68–69 (“Although the 
legislative history of the securities laws is silent as to the government interests furthered by 
nationwide personal jurisdiction, one can easily assume that Congress believed that allowing 
investors to litigate securities fraud issues anywhere in the nation was a beneficial approach to 
policing the stock market, and an important step in furthering the public interest in a stable 
financial community.”). 
 176. Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391 (2006)); see 
also Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 534 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 87–1992, at 2–3 (1962) (noting 
that the bill is designed to broaden venue provisions to permit acts against government officials 
which were, prior to the enactment of the bill, limited to the District of Columbia). Other 
statutes providing national service of process include 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012), regarding 
confirmation of an arbitration award, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(c), 1965 (2006), regarding 
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. For additional 
federal statutes that permit nationwide service of process, see Fullerton, supra note 14, at 67–70, 
and Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 387, 436 n.238 (1992). 
 177. See supra Subsection I.C.1. Although the FRCP authorize the extraterritorial assertion 
of jurisdiction in other cases, see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (authorizing service of process 
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when the first nationwide service of process laws were enacted—and up 
through 1938—a district court’s jurisdiction was generally limited to 
people found or residing in its territory.178 Thus, a defendant in Vermont 
could not generally be forced to appear before a court in Florida unless 
the Vermonter either travelled to Florida or moved there. The 1938 
adoption of the Federal Rules expanded district courts’ territorial reach 
slightly; under the new rules, the Vermonter could be summoned to 
appear before a district court in Florida if the plaintiff could serve the 
defendant with process under Florida’s long-arm statute because the 
federal service rule bootstrapped in the forum state’s service of process 
rules.179 Thereafter, in the ordinary federal question case, a Vermont 
defendant who did not meet Florida’s long-arm jurisdictional rules 
would be protected from suit in Florida. But in cases that involved 
federal question claims where Congress had authorized national service 
of process, there would be no geographical constraints of Florida 
service of process rules;180 accordingly, the Florida district court could 
serve process over the Vermont defendant in Vermont—or anywhere in 
the United States.  
In the abstract, this could have proven disastrous: a tool to prejudice 
defendants and a license to forum-shop. It could have meant that a 
Kansas resident could hale a Wisconsin-based defendant to district court 
in Mississippi,181 and coal operators could drag a District of Columbia-
based federal administrator before a district court in Alabama to take 
advantage of favorable circuit law.182 However, this parade of horribles 
did not occur because, as explained above, a variety of other 
mechanisms protect defendants from being forced to defend themselves 
in far-flung locales.183 Thus, though the Florida court can assert 
                                                                                                                     
through states’ long-arm provisions); id. 4(k)(1)(B) (authorizing service of process within 100 
miles of the court), these maintain a geographical tether to the forum state.  
 178. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text; see also Carrington, supra note 68, at 
738 (footnote omitted) (explaining that “[t]he pattern of federal court dependence on state 
practice” included “conformity to state law in regard to service of process” and, even with “the 
creation of a federal question jurisdiction in 1875 and the sweep of federal substantive policy 
created by Congress in the ensuing decades[,] . . . no change was effected in the law governing 
the summons”).  
 179. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (authorizing service of process based on a forum state’s 
long-arm statute). 
 180. See id. 4(k)(1)(C) (permitting exercise of personal jurisdiction where service is 
“authorized by a federal statute”). 
 181. Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1081–85 (D. Kan. 1978). 
 182. A.J. Taft Coal Co. v. Barnhart, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1300, 1309 (N.D. Ala. 2003). 
 183. See, e.g., Waeltz v. Delta Pilots Ret. Plan, 301 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming, 
despite proper invocation of jurisdiction through national service of process provision, that the 
Atlanta-based defendant was not required to defend itself in the Southern District of Illinois 
because venue was improper due to insufficient contact with Illinois); A.J. Taft Coal Co., 291 F. 
 
38
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/5
2014] CONSTITUTIONAL VENUE 1191 
 
jurisdiction over the Vermont defendant, the statutory and doctrinal 
protections—including the statutory venue provision, a motion to 
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), or forum non conveniens—available 
to the Vermonter may make it unnecessary to consider whether due 
process requires the Vermonter to have minimum contacts with 
Florida.184  
To be clear, Congress’s power to authorize nationwide service of 
process, pursuant to its Article III authority to establish inferior courts, 
is not controversial. The contested question is whether, when Congress 
exercises such power, the Due Process Clause constrains a court from 
action where a domestic defendant would face significant hardship and 
disadvantage in the location the plaintiff selects for trial. In the first half 
of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court indicated that Congress 
could have authorized service of process beyond state or district lines 
but it had not, at that time, done so.185 However, after the enactment of 
the first nationwide jurisdiction statute,186 the Court faced a direct 
challenge to that statute.187 That case, United States v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., involved a suit by the United States against corporations 
                                                                                                                     
Supp. 2d at 1313 (transferring the case under § 1404(a) to Maryland); Schreiber, 448 F. Supp. at 
1081–82, 1101 (dismissing plaintiff’s case after it was transferred to a proper court after 
plaintiff brought the case in a favorable forum to avoid a statute of limitations). See generally 
supra Section I.C. 
 184. See, e.g., Waeltz, 301 F.3d at 811; Ret. Plan of the Unite Here Nat’l Ret. Fund v. Vill. 
Resorts, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 4249 (RPP), 2009 WL 255860, at *2, *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2009) 
(granting the defendant’s motion to transfer venue from New York to Illinois in an ERISA 
enforcement action where the statute authorized nationwide service of process, because all of 
the parties and documents were in Illinois and the only connection to New York was 
convenience for the law firm that represented the plaintiff); Tyson v. Pitney Bowes Long-Term 
Disability Plan, No. 07-CV-3105 (DMC), 2007 WL 4365332, at *2–4 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2007) 
(granting defendant’s motion to transfer venue from New Jersey to Connecticut despite ERISA 
nationwide service of process provision, because of the defendant’s lack of business dealings in 
New Jersey and because the claim originated from events in Connecticut only); see also Robert 
A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the 
Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1, 34 n.158, 36–39 (1988) (noting that, “even in the absence of 
venue provisions,” fairness to the defendant could be restored through transfer of venue or 
forum non conveniens); Barrett, supra note 70, at 629–33 (proposing to amend rules to 
authorize nationwide service of process in all federal cases but ensure venue protections as well 
in order to assure a convenient forum). But see Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 
119 F.3d 935, 939 (11th Cir. 1997) (reaching the question of whether due process requires 
minimum contacts under national service of process provisions); Fullerton, supra note 14, at 
35–38 (arguing that Congress’s power to authorize national service of process should not 
withstand constitutional scrutiny because Congress could eliminate the statutory venue 
protections at its whim and because of the difficulty of getting reversal of trial courts’ 
discretionary decisions regarding venue). 
 185. Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838). 
 186. See Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 226, § 4, 17 Stat. 485, 509. 
 187. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 579–80 (1879). 
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and others implicated in a scandalous, massive investment fraud 
perpetrated by financiers of the transcontinental railroad, which 
included U.S. congressmen.188 The Union Pacific Court upheld the 
statute’s service of process provision and reasoned that Article III, 
section 1 of the Constitution declares that the judicial “power shall be 
vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the Congress 
may, from time to time, ordain” so “[t]he discretion, therefore, of 
Congress as to the number, the character, the territorial limits of the 
courts among which it shall distribute this judicial power, is unrestricted 
except as to the Supreme Court.”189 Although the defendants in that 
case asserted that the Fifth Amendment prevented Congress from 
enacting such a provision, the Supreme Court said only that it was 
aware of “no constitutional objection” to Congress’s ability to enact 
such a provision and remained silent as to the Fifth Amendment 
limitations, if any, on courts seeking to invoke jurisdiction through 
nationwide service of process.190  
This latter issue—whether the invocation of jurisdiction obtained 
under a nationwide service of process provision can violate due 
process—remains a contested question. In Union Pacific, the Supreme 
Court upheld Congress’s power to authorize personal jurisdiction by 
summons service nationwide and found that the relevant geographic 
limitation for federal courts was the United States’ borders, but noted 
that courts should consider matters of convenience and expense before 
they compel parties to answer a summons served nationwide.191 Forty 
years later in Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board,192 the Court made 
clear that nationwide service of process was to be authorized sparingly, 
describing it as one of the “few clearly expressed and carefully guarded 
exceptions” to the general rule that “a defendant in a civil suit can be 
subjected to its jurisdiction in personam only by service within the 
district.”193 In so saying, the Court refused to interpret seemingly broad 
statutory language in the Transportation Act of 1920 so as to permit the 
Railroad Labor Board to compel an individual to come before a court in 
                                                                                                                     
 188. See id. at 572–78 (describing at length the government’s case against the defendants). 
See generally J.B. CRAWFORD, THE CREDIT MOBILIER OF AMERICA (1880), available at 
http://archive.org/details/creditmobilierof00craw; ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, THE UNION PACIFIC 
RAILROAD: A CASE IN PREMATURE ENTERPRISE 17, 53 (1960); HENRY KIRKE WHITE, HISTORY OF 
THE UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY 21–23, 73–76 (1895), available at https://archive.org/details/
historyunionpac00whitgoog. 
 189. Union Pac., 98 U.S. at 602 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 190. See id. at 605. 
 191. Id. at 604. 
 192. 268 U.S. 619 (1925). 
 193. See id. at 622, 624. 
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any district in the country.194 Twenty-one years later, following the 
FRCP’s expansion of the territorial limits for service of process from 
district to state lines, the Supreme Court again stated that “Congress 
could provide for service of process anywhere in the United States.”195 
In recent years, however, the Court has explicitly reserved opinion on 
whether due process constrains the scope of these national service of 
process statutes.196  
It is perhaps telling that, despite the Court’s sweeping statements 
that Article III permits Congress to authorize district courts to serve 
process nationwide, Congress has generally declined to do so. In the 
few circumstances where it does so, it has done so cautiously, evincing 
uncertainty as it expanded district courts’ jurisdiction. At the same time 
as it enacted these statutes, largely in the face of events that illuminated 
public problems that could not otherwise be addressed, members of 
Congress expressed concerns.197 Those concerns were assuaged in part 
by the inclusion of venue provisions designed to guard against forcing 
defendants to defend themselves in faraway forums and to prevent 
forum-shopping.198 Moreover, Congress has repeatedly rejected 
proposals to make nationwide service of process the default rule in all 
cases that involve federal questions.199  
                                                                                                                     
 194. Id. at 626–27. 
 195. Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442–43 (1946). 
 196. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (plurality 
opinion) (explicitly declining to answer “whether Congress could, consistent with the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien 
defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the 
defendant and the State in which the federal court sits”); see also Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. 
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987) (declining to consider the constitutional issues 
surrounding federal courts exercising personal jurisdiction based on an aggregation of the 
defendant’s contacts with nation as a whole), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 
4(k). 
 197. See, e.g., 53 CONG. REC. 12,150 (1916) (statement of Sen. Atlee Pomerene) 
(expressing concern about the “substantial denial of justice” that would result from forcing 
insurance beneficiaries affected by the Interpleader Act to travel hundreds of miles to litigate 
their claims and arguing that it would nullify any benefit afforded by the legislation); 51 CONG. 
REC. 9,414 (1914) (statements of Rep. Clement C. Dickinson) (arguing against provisions that 
would allow litigants to file suit in places wholly unrelated to where the cause of action arose). 
 198. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 22(a), 48 Stat. 74, 86 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2012)) (setting venue “in the district wherein the defendant is found or is 
an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the sale took place, if the defendant 
participated therein”); Act of Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, § 1, 49 Stat. 1096, 1096 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (2006)) (setting venue in interpleader cases where any one of the 
claimants resided); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2006) (setting venue for antitrust actions “in the judicial 
district whereof [the defendant corporation] is an inhabitant [or] in any district wherein it may 
be found or transacts business”). 
 199. See Casad, supra note 51, at 1597–99. 
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In light of the fractured jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction in 
recent years,200 it remains unclear whether due process operates to 
protect a fair location for trial when nationwide service of process is 
authorized. In a federal question case in a federal court, the relevant 
sovereign is the United States government; therefore, under the 
sovereignty-focused inquiry espoused in Pennoyer, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Burnham, and Justice Kennedy’s decision in J. McIntyre 
Machinery, personal jurisdiction should be satisfied if the defendant has 
minimum contacts with the United States.201 However, this ignores the 
defendant-focused concerns about fairness and burden that drive the 
analyses in International Shoe, Shaffer v. Heitner, and Insurance Corp. 
of Ireland.202  
This doctrinal ambiguity, coupled with the difficult-to-harmonize 
concerns, has resulted in a circuit split. Courts disagree whether, when 
national service of process is authorized, a federal court may aggregate 
national contacts with the United States to determine if the due process 
minimum contacts test is satisfied or whether due process protects 
defendants from being haled into an inconvenient location even if that 
person has sufficient aggregate contacts with the United States.203 Put 
                                                                                                                     
 200. See supra Section I.B.  
 201. See supra Section I.B. 
 202. See supra Section I.B. This concern was also one of two critical elements in the 
personal jurisdiction analyses in World-Wide Volkswagen, Burger King, and Asahi. See supra 
Section I.B.  
 203. See Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir. 
1997) (“There is considerable debate, however, over the scope of the limits imposed by the Fifth 
Amendment when jurisdiction is established over a domestic defendant via a nationwide service 
of process provision.”). Compare Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 370 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2002) (applying a “a fairness analysis consisting of more than an assessment of the defendant’s 
national contacts,” based on the Fourteenth Amendment “fair play and substantial justice” test, 
though without deciding whether “such an analysis is appropriate in this context”), Peay v. 
BellSouth Med. Assist. Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e hold that in a federal 
question case where jurisdiction is invoked based on nationwide service of process, the Fifth 
Amendment requires the plaintiff’s choice of forum to be fair and reasonable to the 
defendant.”), and Republic of Pan., 119 F.3d at 947 (holding that the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause requires courts to consider the burden on the defendant, even in the rare 
circumstances where a “defendant may have sufficient contacts with the United States as a 
whole but still will be unduly burdened by the assertion of jurisdiction in a faraway and 
inconvenient forum”), with Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979) (“[T]here 
can be no question but that the defendant, a resident of the United States, has sufficient contacts 
with the United States to support the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction over him by a United 
States court.”), Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 & n.25, 157 (1st Cir. 1978) (noting that the 
Constitution does not require federal courts to follow state boundaries), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980), and Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 
(2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the primary question the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
requires, aside from whether service was reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the 
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another way, the question becomes whether the defendant must have 
sufficient contacts with the state of the forum court or need the 
defendant have only minimum contacts with the nation? If the latter, 
where do “fair play” and “substantial justice” fit in?204 
The majority of the courts apply the “pure national contacts” or 
“aggregated contacts” approach, which requires only that the defendant 
have “minimum contacts” with the United States as a whole.205 Even 
within this camp, there is no unified theory; some describe the 
minimum contacts test, in this context, as not “particularly relevant,”206 
while others explain that the national contacts test is the fairness test—
they construe fairness to mean being fairly subject to the sovereign’s 
authority and conclude that aggregated contacts with various points in 
the United States satisfy this test.207  
However, at least three circuits have found that International Shoe 
requires something more. The Eleventh Circuit, most ardently, has 
concluded that the Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth Amendment, 
protects individual litigants against the burdens of litigation in an 
unduly inconvenient forum and therefore courts must also consider 
whether litigation in “a faraway and inconvenient forum” will burden 
                                                                                                                     
suit, is whether the defendant has, in the aggregate, minimum contacts with the United States). 
See also DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[W]e 
are not sure that some geographic limit short of the entire United States might not be 
incorporated into the ‘fairness’ component of the fifth amendment.”). 
 204. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 205. See, e.g., In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 
2004) (relying on “aggregate contacts with the United States as a whole”); United States v. 
Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that “the analytic exercises 
are performed with reference to the United States as a whole, rather than with reference to a 
particular state”); Fitzsimmons, 589 F.2d at 333 n.4 (“Service beyond the bounds of the 
territorial United States obviously raises questions as to the contact of the defendant with the 
United States, questions that are absent when a United States citizen is served within the 
country.”); Mariash, 496 F.2d at 1143 (“[P]lainly, where, as here, the defendants reside within 
the territorial boundaries of the United States, the ‘minimal contacts,’ required to justify the 
federal government’s exercise of power over them, are present.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958))). 
 206. Mariash, 496 F.2d at 1143. 
 207. See Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 
1994) (holding that “sovereignty defines the scope of the due process test”); Fitzsimmons, 589 
F.2d at 333 (“Here the sovereign is the United States, and there can be no question but that the 
defendant, a resident citizen of the United States, has sufficient contacts with the United States 
to support the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction over him by a United States court.”); see 
also Diamond Mortgage Corp. of Ill. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1246 n.13 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(refusing to reconsider Fitzsimmons). 
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the defendant.208 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a “fairness 
test” that considers both the defendant’s contacts with the site of the 
forum and the burden to the defendant, in addition to other location-
focused concerns traditionally associated with venue determinations.209 
The Third Circuit also treats the due process inquiry as a two-prong test, 
asking first whether the defendant has contacts with the United States 
and, separately, whether it would comport with fair play and substantial 
justice to bring the defendant to the adjudicating forum.210 And, finally, 
there appears to be another approach: “a ‘flexible minimum contacts’ 
analysis that evaluates a defendant’s contacts with the forum, but in a 
less demanding fashion than the Fourteenth Amendment requires.”211  
In most of the cases thus far, distinct analyses adopted by different 
circuits have not produced markedly different results. This is because 
the majority of cases in which this question has arisen involve corporate 
defendants—domestic and international entities and officers.212 Because 
these defendants have fairly obvious resources and the ability to transact 
beyond their area of residence, courts have not been persuaded that the 
defendants are being unfairly forced to litigate in a far-off forum.213 
Given the business-focused nature of many of the statutes that contain 
national service of process provisions, this is unsurprising and perhaps 
even serves as a rationale for permitting such geographically expansive 
service. But in the case of a less resourced defendant, these approaches 
will yield markedly different results: for defendants who cannot afford 
to travel or pay for witnesses and others to travel to the litigation forum, 
a fairness inquiry could mean the difference between a successful 
defense and a loss (or forced settlement).214 
                                                                                                                     
 208. Republic of Pan., 119 F.3d at 945, 947; see also Handley v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 
732 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1984) (“In a case like the present one, where a federal court is 
sitting in a federal question case, the purpose of minimum contacts is to protect the defendant 
‘against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.’” (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980))).  
 209. Peay v. Bellsouth Med. Assist. Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 210. Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 370 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 211. Republic of Pan., 119 F.3d at 942 (recognizing this other approach). 
 212. See, e.g., Peay, 205 F.3d at 1213 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding no showing of unfairness in 
requiring corporations based in the southeastern United States to defend themselves in Utah in 
light of the companies’ ample resources and “modern methods of communication and 
transportation”); ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 627 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding 
no demonstration of unfairness in requiring a New Hampshire-based corporate officer and 
company—with South Carolinian customers—to defend themselves in South Carolina). 
 213. See sources cited supra note 212. 
 214. While some of these defendants could avail themselves of statutory venue provisions 
or seek a change of venue, these mechanisms do not guarantee a fair forum, particularly for 
nonresident defendants, see supra note 144, and in any case would nonetheless require the 
defendant to conduct some litigation in a potentially unfair forum. 
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To be sure, even in national service of process cases, this 
constitutional question is infrequently reached. As commentators point 
out, modern technology and globalization can minimize much of the 
burden to a defendant and thereby alleviate the harms of haling her to 
court.215 However, subconstitutional protections fail in some 
circumstances, most frequently in cases that involve foreign parties, and 
it is often the poorest and most vulnerable defendants who experience 
harm when they must defend personal or business interests far from 
home. In these situations, recognizing the constitutional floor of venue 
not only elucidates the doctrinal questions but also ensures protection of 
a fundamental principle that underpins our judicial system. 
B.  Detained Deportation Proceedings 
There is, perhaps, no cleaner and more consequential example of the 
constitutional floor of venue than the current plight of detained 
immigrants facing deportation. Immigrants arrested and detained by 
federal immigration authorities are routinely transferred thousands of 
miles away from their place of arrest and residence216 to remote 
detention facilities in rural areas of the South217 with which they have 
no connections whatsoever. Such transfers regularly create 
insurmountable barriers to access to counsel and critical evidence 
necessary to mount a defense, as well as make it impossible for 
immigrants to produce key witnesses.218 Current law and common 
practice allow the federal immigration agency, which prosecutes 
deportation cases,219 unfettered discretion to venue deportation 
proceedings anywhere it desires.220 There are no statutory or regulatory 
                                                                                                                     
 215. Sterk, supra note 20, at 1204 (stating that “the Court has indicated that modern 
transportation and communication systems diminish the importance of personal inconvenience 
as a constraint on personal jurisdiction” but noting that “inconvenience is not dead”). 
 216. Markowitz, supra note 7, at 1302; see also Huge Increase in Transfers of ICE 
Detainees, supra note 8. 
 217. DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2009) (providing a heatmap that shows where there is an 
excess of detention capacity over demand for detention space). 
 218. AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 30, 
34 (2009), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf; 
see also infra notes 227–31 and accompanying text. 
 219. The agency responsible for the detention of immigrants and prosecution in deportation 
proceedings is the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE), a 
division of the Department of Homeland Security. Overview, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview (last visited Aug. 7, 2014). Deportation 
proceedings, which are technically known as “removal proceedings,” are civil proceedings. See 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010). 
 220. See infra note 234 and accompanying text. Human Right Watch found that “ICE 
claims an almost unfettered power to transfer detainees at will, resulting in a disorderly system 
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limits on venue, regardless of any hardships that a respondent may face 
in a distant location.221 Far from venue’s historic origins as a 
defendant’s shield against an unfair location for trial, the venue rules in 
deportation proceedings are a sword that the prosecuting agency can use 
to select the most disadvantageous location possible for the immigrant.  
A firsthand account from a 2009 report on immigration transfers by 
Human Rights Watch contains an illustrative example of a common 
immigration transfer scenario and demonstrates how the venue rules and 
practices for detained deportation proceedings present significant 
obstacles to a fair hearing: 
I lived in upstate New York for 10 years with my four 
children and my wife . . . ICE said I was deportable 
because of an old marijuana possession conviction where I 
never served a day in jail, just paid a fine of $250 . . . They 
took me to Varick Street [detention center in New York 
City] for a few days and then sent me straight to [detention 
in] New Mexico. In New York when I was detained, I was 
about to get an attorney through one of the churches, but 
that went away once they sent me here to New 
Mexico . . . . All my evidence and stuff that I need is right 
there in New York. I’ve been trying to get all my case 
information from New York . . . writing to ICE to get my 
records. But they won’t give me my records, they haven’t 
given me nothing. I’m just representing myself with no 
evidence to present.222  
There are structural factors at play in the immigration detention 
context that create obstacles to fair venue for detained immigrants’ 
deportation proceedings, in particular the glut of relatively inexpensive 
immigration detention capacity in remote locations in the South and the 
relative dearth of detention capacity near many significant immigration 
population centers.223 The numbers show the scope of the problem, with 
                                                                                                                     
of detainee musical chairs that often violates non-citizens’ rights.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 19 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1209web 
wcover_0.pdf.  
 221. See infra notes 234–36 and accompanying text. While the governing law and 
regulations permit venue to lie in any Immigration Court in any location in the nation for any 
respondent, there is a provision in the regulations that permit a respondent to move for a change 
of venue. As discussed infra at notes 237–46 and accompanying text, this mechanism is, 
however, woefully inadequate to address the grave obstacles to a fair hearing imposed by the 
transfer phenomenon. 
 222. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 220, at 1 (alterations in original). 
 223. SCHRIRO, supra note 217, at 6–9 (2009) (noting “significant . . . shortages [of 
detention capacity] . . . in California and the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast states” and indicating 
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approximately 430,000 immigrants civilly detained last year for 
deportation proceedings,224 and with hundreds of thousands of those 
immigrants transferred, as described above, each year.225 The enormous 
scope of this problem has attracted significant attention from NGOs, 
international bodies, and governmental agencies alike in recent years, as 
a number of studies have been published documenting and analyzing 
the transfer phenomenon.226 
                                                                                                                     
such with heatmaps), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-
detention-rpt.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 220, at 20 (“ICE maintains the discretion 
to detain people wherever there is bed space.”); see also Jennifer Ludden, All Things 
Considered: Immigration Transfers Add to System’s Problems (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 11, 
2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100597565 
(interviewing a detainee transferred Pennsylvania to Texas). In recent years, the federal 
immigration authorities made modest efforts to increase detention capacity near certain 
immigration population centers, see, e.g., Kirk Semple, Plan to Upgrade a New Jersey Jail into 
a Model for Immigration Detention Centers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/nyregion/28detain.html, but to date those efforts fall far 
short of the action necessary to remedy the vast transfer problem. 
 224. JOHN SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR. 
STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011, at 1, 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/enforcement_ar_201 
1.pdf (reporting 429,247 total admissions to ICE detention facilities in 2011). 
 225. In fiscal year 2007, the most recent year for which DHS reported transfer data, the 
agency transferred 261,910 detainees from one detention facility to another. U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S 
TRACKING AND TRANSFERS OF DETAINEES 2 (2009), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/OIG_09-41_Mar09.pdf. Data the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse reported 
demonstrate that the transfer phenomenon surged in recent years. Huge Increase in Transfers of 
ICE Detainees, supra note 8. In 2008, the most recent year with available data, federal 
immigration authorities transferred over one-half of ICE detainees and subjected to multiple 
transfers approximately one-quarter of ICE detainees. Id. 
 226. See, e.g., ACLU OF N.J., BEHIND BARS: THE FAILURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE TREATMENT OF IMMIGRATION DETAINEES IN NEW 
JERSEY 11–12 (2007), available at http://www.aclu-nj.org/files/9613/1540/4573/051507Detentio 
nReport.pdf; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 218, at 7, 29, 34–35, 46; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 220, at 3–5; INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS ¶¶ 78–81 (2010), available at 
http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/ReportOnImmigrationInTheUnited%20States-DetentionAndDuePro 
cess.pdf; RUBEN LOYO & CAROLYN CORRADO, N.Y. UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGR. RIGHTS 
CLINIC, LOCKED UP BUT NOT FORGOTTEN: OPENING ACCESS TO FAMILY & COMMUNITY IN THE 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM 1–3 (2010), available at http://afsc.org/sites/
afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/LockedUpFINAL.pdf; NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., 
HEARTLAND ALLIANCE, ISOLATED IN DETENTION: LIMITED ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL IN 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES JEOPARDIZES A FAIR DAY IN COURT 6–9 (2010), available 
at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Detention%20Isolation%20 
Report%20FULL%20REPORT%202010%2009%2023_0.pdf; LAURA RÓTOLO, ACLU OF 
MASS., DETENTION AND DEPORTATION IN THE AGE OF ICE 6–7 (2008), available at 
http://www.aclum.org/sites/all/files/education/aclu_ice_detention_report.pdf; SCHRIRO, supra 
note 217, at 22–24; KAREN TUMLIN ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. ET AL., A BROKEN 
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The hardships and injustice that result from immigration transfers 
are thus well documented. The obligation to defend themselves far from 
their families and homes creates significant obstacles to a detained 
immigrant’s ability to mount a defense to deportation. First, transfers 
create significant barriers for immigrants who seek legal 
representation.227 Since “[eighty] percent of detainees [are] held in 
facilities which were severely underserved by legal aid organizations” 
and over twenty-five percent are held in a facility with no access to 
legal aid organizations of any kind,228 it is no surprise that 
approximately eighty-four percent of detained immigrants do not have 
legal representation.229 Second, the distance from family and other 
support networks, which these transfers create, significantly impedes an 
immigrant’s ability to gather and present relevant evidence.230 Third, 
and perhaps most disturbingly, federal immigration authorities’ 
unchecked control over venue allows them to manipulate the controlling 
law of a case because the case will be governed by the law of the federal 
circuit in the jurisdiction in which the immigration court sits.231 These 
                                                                                                                     
SYSTEM: CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS REVEAL FAILURES IN U.S. IMMIGRANT DETENTION CENTERS 
65–66 (2009), available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=9; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., supra note 225, at 6–8; Huge Increase in Transfers of ICE Detainees, supra note 8. 
 227. E.g., NAT’L IMMIGR. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 226, at 3. 
 228. Id. A recent study demonstrated that two-thirds of New Yorkers arrested by federal 
immigration authorities were transferred to far-off detention facilities and that detained 
immigrants who were not transferred were approximately twice as likely to obtain counsel as 
those who were transferred. Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study 
Report, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings 
(pt. 1), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 364 (2011).  
 229. NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND PROMOTING 
JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 1 (2008), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/
files/resources/downloads/LOP_Evaluation_May2008_final.pdf. Not surprisingly, the ability to 
obtain counsel has an enormous impact on the outcome of these cases. N.Y. IMMIGRANT 
REPRESENTATION STUDY, STUDY GRP. ON IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A 
MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL TO NEW YORK IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 1 
(2012), available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/NYIRS_ReportII.pdf 
(noting that immigrants with lawyers are approximately 500% more likely to avoid deportation 
than immigrants without lawyers); Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study 
Report, supra note 228, at 383–86. 
 230. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 220, at 3–5, 58–59; INTER-AM. COMM’N ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 226, ¶ 398. 
 231. See, e.g., Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 31 (B.I.A. 1989) (noting that the law of the 
circuit in which the case “aris[es]” governs immigration cases); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra 
note 220, at 36 (noting that transfers “can have the effect of altering the law applied to a 
detainee’s case, which is determined by the federal circuit court of appeals with jurisdiction over 
the facility where the detainee is housed”). The practical result is that federal immigration 
authorities transfer a huge number of immigrants arrested in states in the Second and Ninth 
Circuits to detention facilites in southern states where the proceedings are governed by Fifth 
Circuit law, which is generally far less favorable to the immigrants. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
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are, of course, precisely the parade of horribles that venue doctrine was 
originally designed to protect against. 
The operative question for our present inquiry is: how is it possible, 
with all the various layers of venue protection embedded in our legal 
system, that the law permits such widespread instances of gravely unfair 
venues, presenting such significant obstacles to fair adjudications, in 
proceedings where such liberty interests are at stake?  
Unlike most other civil proceedings, venue statutes offer no 
protection in this case. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)232 is 
silent as to the proper venue for removal proceedings,233 but the 
regulations promulgated under the Act provide that venue is proper 
wherever federal immigration authorities choose to file the charging 
instrument.234 Accordingly, the first line of venue defense—the venue 
rules themselves—impose no limit and give the initiating party, the 
government, complete control over the venue of the proceedings.  
Nor do service of process rules limit the invocation of jurisdiction in 
this case, as they would in most other civil suits. As discussed supra in 
Subsection I.C.1, service of process rules often also function to ensure a 
fair venue. However, this subconstitutional venue protection likewise 
fails in the deportation context. The INA and the regulations provide 
that service may be in person or, if personal service is not practicable, 
by mail.235 However, unlike the general rule FRCP 4 lays out, the 
immigration statute and regulations do not provide any geographic limit 
with regard to where federal immigration authorities may effect 
service.236  
Finally, the change of venue mechanism is rarely a solution in this 
situation because it affords far less protection than the general civil 
transfer provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The only potential protection 
against an unfair venue in deportation proceedings is the ability of the 
                                                                                                                     
supra note 220, at 6, 36–37, 37 tbl.11; see also INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 226, ¶ 399 (“[T]he Inter-American Commission observes that the immigration law in each 
U.S. federal circuit can vary significantly . . . . [T]he highest rates of immigrant transfers are 
into the federal court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas), which 
reportedly has very low grant rates of immigration relief.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 232. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–537 (2012)). 
 233. See id. 
 234. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(a) (2012) (“Venue shall lie at the Immigration Court where 
jurisdiction vests pursuant to § 1003.14.”); id. § 1003.14(a) (“Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings 
before an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging document is filed with the 
Immigration Court by the Service.”); cf. La Franca v. INS, 413 F.2d 686, 689 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(“There is no clear mandate in either the statute or regulations as to where a hearing should be 
held.”). 
 235. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 (2012) (defining “service”).  
 236. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1), with FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). 
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immigrant to move for a change of venue.237 Unfortunately, the change 
of venue mechanism likewise fails to ensure a fair venue.238 The 
regulations provide that venue may be changed at the discretion of the 
Immigration Judge upon a showing of “good cause.”239  
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the immigration courts’ 
administrative appellate body, has interpreted the “good cause” standard 
as requiring a balancing of the factors generally relevant to venue, such 
as “administrative convenience, expeditious treatment of the case, 
location of witnesses, and cost of transporting witnesses or evidence to 
a new location.”240 However, change of venue motions are routinely 
                                                                                                                     
 237. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b); see also Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (discussing the regulation for change of venue in removal proceedings). There is also 
a recently promulgated administrative policy which purports to “minimize, to the extent 
possible, detainee transfers outside [of] the area of responsibility” where they were 
apprehended. John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, Policy 11022.1: 
Detainee Transfers 1 (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
reform/pdf/hd-detainee-transfers.pdf. The new policy acknowledges the hardships of transfers as 
it purports to prohibit transfers when the detainee has immediate family members in the area, 
when an attorney enters an appearance, when removal proceedings are already pending or 
ongoing, or when a hearing is scheduled. Id. at 2–3. Unfortunately, the policy falls far short of 
delineating a list of permissible venues necessary to insure a fair hearing and does not take 
account of issues such as the ability to obtain counsel, gather and present evidence, and the 
prejudice the law of a far-off circuit might present. Moreover, the policy contains a number of 
exceptions, which include a rather large exception for when federal immigration authorities 
deem the transfer necessary to “relieve or prevent facility overcrowding.” Id. at 3. Insofar as 
ICE detention capacity is still not aligned geographically with its enforcement operations, this 
exception ensures that the transfer phenomenon will continue to result in the routine deprivation 
of fair venues for tens or hundreds of thousands of immigration detainees each year.  
 238. Ballesteros, 452 F.3d at 1159–60. 
 239. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b) (2012); see also Ballesteros, 452 F.3d at 1159 (“[Regulation 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.20(b)] gives the immigration judge complete discretion, even to the extent that 
the immigration judge may still deny the . . . change of venue motion when good cause is 
present.”); Kin Sang Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34, 39 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The decision of whether to 
grant a change of venue is committed to the [immigration judge’s] sound discretion and will not 
be overturned except for an abuse of that discretion.”). But see Campos v. Nail, 43 F.3d 1285, 
1289 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Although motions to change venue are left to the sound discretion of the 
immigration judge, an arbitrary refusal to change venue can be a violation of the statutory right 
to a reasonable opportunity to attend and present evidence at the deportation hearing.”). 
 240. Rahman, 20 I. & N. Dec. 480, 482–83 (B.I.A. 1992) (citing Velasquez, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 377 (B.I.A. 1986)). In Rahman, a detained immigrant sought to change venue from 
Arizona to Los Angeles because his “counsel of choice, his witnesses, and an interpreter would 
be available” there. Id. at 481. The Immigration Court granted the change of venue motion, but 
the BIA reversed the immigration judge in part for the judge’s improper focus on the 
defendant’s “lack of connections to the place where he was detained.” Id. at 482–83, 485. 
Additionally, the BIA held that a detainee did not establish good cause by residence alone and 
that “[t]he Government is not required to accommodate the applicant’s choice of a distant 
attorney and his acquisition of an interpreter by changing venue at considerable expense.” Id. at 
484. 
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denied even if the location of proceedings is distant from the 
immigrant’s place of residence;241 deprives the immigrant of access to 
counsel242 or evidence;243 is far from the location of witnesses;244 and 
changes the governing circuit law in ways prejudicial to the 
immigrant.245 The case law demonstrates that “administrative 
                                                                                                                     
 241. See, e.g., Meng Fei Ye v. Holder, 491 F. App’x 479 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding the 
immigration judge’s denial of change of venue motion over the immigrant’s argument that 
venue in San Antonio represented a burden because the immigrant lived in New York); Frech v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 1277, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding immigration judge’s 
denial of change of venue motion over immigrant’s argument that venue in Miami required 
prohibitively expensive travel from his home in Houston); Rivera, 19 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 
1988) (upholding the immigration judge’s denial of change of venue motion requesting change 
from Puerto Rico to New York City because that change would have prejudiced the 
government); see also Rahman, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 484 (“[W]hile the factors commonly 
associated with the applicant’s place of residence may be relevant to the question of proper 
venue, the mere fact that an applicant allegedly resides or wishes to reside in another city, 
without a showing of other significant factors associated with such residence, is insufficient 
cause to outweigh the Service’s opposition to a motion for change of venue . . . .” (citing Rivera, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 688)). 
 242. See, e.g., Mayers v. INS, 70 F.3d 1268, 1268 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding the 
immigration judge’s denial of change of venue motion from Louisiana to New York despite the 
fact that immigrant’s attorney was in New York and immigrant subsequently appeared pro se); 
Benito Aguayo-Diaz, File: A91 750 478, 2007 WL 4182270 (B.I.A. Oct. 16, 2007) (upholding 
the immigration judge’s denial of a change of venue motion because, “while it is unfortunate 
that [the immigrant] is detained at a location at some distance from his chosen counsel, that 
inconvenience is insufficient, without more, to compel a change of venue”). 
 243. See, e.g., Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1253, 
1255–56 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding the immigration judge’s denial of a change of venue motion 
because, inter alia, immigrant’s “right to present witnesses and evidence [was not] violated by 
the transfer to and hearing in Louisiana” because “[h]e had the same legal right to present 
witnesses and evidence in Louisiana that he would have had anywhere, and he has not 
demonstrated any practical prejudice to that right resulting from the hearing’s location”). 
 244. See, e.g., Meng Fei Ye, 491 F. App’x at 479–80 (upholding the immigration judge’s 
denial of a change of venue motion over the immigrant’s argument that it would be “more 
convenient and cost effective for [him]” for venue not to be in San Antonio because his 
witnesses were in New York); Frech, 491 F.3d at 1281–82 (upholding denial of a change of 
venue where all witnesses lived in Houston and proceedings were held in Miami); Wenfei Chen, 
File: A200 657 453, 2011 WL 585623 (B.I.A. Jan. 31, 2011) (upholding denial of change of 
venue motion over immigrant’s argument that “potential witnesses reside elsewhere”); Bader, 
17 I. & N. Dec. 525, 526 (B.I.A. 1980) (upholding the immigration judge’s denial of a change of 
venue motion over the defendant’s argument that a change from Buffalo to Miami would have 
allowed him to present expert testimony). 
 245. See, e.g., Robledo-Amaya v. Holder, 354 F. App’x 167, 170 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(upholding denial of a change of venue motion notwithstanding the claim that venue out of 
circuit of residence affected controlling law and rendered the petitioner ineligible for relief); 
Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1157–58 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); Gosine, File: A075 
231 637, 2010 WL 2601543 (B.I.A. June 11, 2010) (upholding denial of a change of venue 
motion notwithstanding the claim that venue out of circuit of residence affected controlling law 
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convenience”—which usually translates to the cost to the government to 
return a detained immigrant to his place of abode and apprehension—
dominates all other factors.246 Moreover, at a very practical level, it is 
extremely difficult for detained, sometimes undereducated immigrants, 
who have no legal counsel, and often are unfamiliar with the laws and 
language of the United States, to adequately prepare and document a 
motion to change venue.247 
Thus, since the traditional venue-protective mechanisms fail to 
operate, all that remain are the due process protections against an unfair 
location. But since those due process protections are located in the 
personal jurisdiction doctrine,248 it does not provide any protection in 
the federal deportation context.249 The United States is the sovereign 
that seeks to assert jurisdiction over the immigrant. Therefore, an 
immigrant who is arrested at his residence in Seattle, Washington, and 
transferred to a detention facility in Florence, Arizona, cannot plausibly 
claim she lacks minimum contacts with the relevant sovereign, or that 
the federal forum is unreasonable, as she in fact lives in the United 
                                                                                                                     
and rendered respondent ineligible for relief); Espinal, File: A38 676 095, 2006 WL 3252544 
(B.I.A. Aug. 17, 2006) (same). 
 246. See, e.g., Lovell v. INS, 52 F.3d 458, 460–61 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of a 
change of venue motion in part because of the cost to the government of transporting the 
petitioner); Santos-Sanchez v. INS, 12 F.3d 1098 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming denial of a change 
of venue motion because of the cost to the government of transporting the respondent and the 
late stage of the proceedings); Rivera, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 690 (affirming denial of a change of 
venue motion based in part on the cost to the government of transporting witnesses if the court 
changed the venue).  
 247. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 220, at 61–65 (noting that some detainees, 
especially those without representation, will not be able to successfully make a motion for 
change of venue). 
 248. See supra Section I.B. 
 249. As an initial matter, in our personal jurisdiction inquiry, we have the issue of 
presence. That is, at the time when an immigrant held in detention in Texas seeks to challenge 
the jurisdiction of the immigration court at the detention facility, she is of course present in 
Texas and presence is the traditional touchstone of personal jurisdiction. See McDonald v. 
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (“The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power . . . .”); supra 
Section I.A. But see Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 637 n.11 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that “there may be cases in which a defendant’s 
involuntary or unknowing presence in a State does not support the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over him”). However, our courts long ago recognized that presence obtained by 
force was insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. See id. at 613 (plurality opinion) (“Most 
States . . . [by the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries] had statutes or common-law rules 
that exempted from service of process individuals who were brought into the forum by force or 
fraud . . . .”); id. at 631 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A]lthough, beginning 
with the Romans, judicial tribunals for over a millennium permitted jurisdiction to be acquired 
by force, by the 19th century . . . this method had largely disappeared.” (citation omitted)). 
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States.250 As a result of the failure of all subconstitutional venue-
protective mechanisms and because of the misplacement of due process 
protections against unfair locations in the personal jurisdiction inquiry, 
detained deportation proceedings expose the usually hidden 
constitutional floor of venue. By revealing the way venue can be 
manipulated without a constitutional safety net, these examples—
national service of process cases and detained deportation 
proceedings—demonstrate the need to recognize the constitutional 
underpinnings of venue.  
III.  A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF VENUE 
Our examination of the interrelated origins of venue and personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence demonstrates the tangled history of these two 
doctrines and helps us understand how the core venue interest in a fair 
location for trial became miscognized as a part of the personal 
jurisdiction inquiry. The rise of interstate commerce, transportation, and 
communication technologies prompted states to reach beyond their 
borders and expand the jurisdictional limits of their courts through long-
arm statutes.251 Accordingly, throughout the latter half of the twentieth 
century, these changes forced the Supreme Court to define the due 
process limits that constrained when plaintiffs could hale defendants 
into courts in far-off states.252 In International Shoe, the Court situated 
that due process inquiry in personal jurisdiction doctrine.253 It was, on a 
theoretical level, an odd choice from the outset because, as the history 
demonstrates, fairness in location is the core of venue whereas personal 
jurisdiction focuses on the power of the sovereign entity, not the rights 
of individuals.254 As a result, over the past quarter century the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction cases have been marked by fractured decisions 
with dueling opinions that articulate conflicting visions of the nature of 
the due process inquiry in personal jurisdiction analysis.255  
The theoretical conflict is, in most cases, just that: theoretical. 
However, when the federal nature of a case negates the venue-protective 
                                                                                                                     
 250. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 198 F. App’x 218, 221–23 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(rejecting New York resident immigrant’s claim that the Immigration Court in York, 
Pennsylvania, lacked personal jurisdiction over him, because he had sufficient minimum 
contacts with the United States); Aquilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, 490 F. Supp. 
2d 42, 48 (D. Mass.) (“[T]he court [is not] aware of[] any constitutional right to have a removal 
hearing held in a specific venue.”), aff’d, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 251. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); McGee v. 
Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957). 
 252. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 253. See supra Section I.B. 
 254. See supra Section I.A. 
 255. See supra Section I.B. 
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function of personal jurisdiction and when all of the other 
subconstitutional safeguards fail—as is the case in detained deportation 
cases—we expose, in the starkest of circumstances, the constitutional 
floor of venue.256 Altering the concept of the due process fair location 
inquiry as venue, however, reconciles the dissonance of the individual 
rights framework with the origins and core of personal jurisdiction and 
protects the individual rights element of due process.257 Indeed, this 
reframing can bring coherence to the muddled case law because fairness 
in location has little to do with jurisdiction and everything to do with 
due process and venue.  
The Supreme Court has, in various opinions, identified two separate 
due process interests it associates with personal jurisdiction, both of 
which International Shoe’s minimum contacts requirement purportedly 
protects. First, since Pennoyer, the Court recognizes that due process 
imposes a limit on the authority of the sovereign to assert personal 
                                                                                                                     
 256. See supra Part II. 
 257. Compare J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788–89 (2011) 
(plurality opinion) (explaining that “jurisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority 
rather than fairness” and identifying the “principal inquiry” in personal jurisdiction cases as the 
question “whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a 
sovereign”), Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“To 
determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process, we have 
long relied on the principles traditionally followed by American courts in marking out the 
territorial limits of each State’s authority.”), and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) 
(describing due process restrictions on state court assertions of personal jurisdiction as a 
“consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States”), with J. McIntyre 
Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (insisting that the 
constitutional elements of the personal jurisdiction inquiry rest upon “defendant-focused 
fairness”), id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he constitutional limits on a state court’s 
adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not state sovereignty.”), 
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 629–30 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (focusing the personal 
jurisdiction inquiry on fairness to litigants rather than on notions of sovereignty and physical 
power), Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982) 
(“The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. . . . must 
be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process 
Clause.”), id. at 713–14 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Whenever the Court’s 
notions of fairness are not offended, jurisdiction apparently may be upheld.”), World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted) (characterizing the 
“reasonableness or fairness” of haling litigants into court as the “primary concern” in the 
personal jurisdiction due process inquiry), Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) 
(describing “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” as the “central 
concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction,” as opposed to the “mutually exclusive 
sovereignty of the States”), and Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[I]n 
order to subject a defendant to a judgment . . . if he be not present within . . . the forum, he 
[must] have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).  
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jurisdiction.258 This limit on sovereign power is sometimes tied more to 
the federalist structure of our system, international law norms, and the 
division of power among the states than it is to any individual right 
inherent in due process.259 This first due process interest is embodied in 
the Court’s amenability-to-suit inquiry, which requires that a nonpresent 
defendant purposefully avail herself of the protections or benefits of the 
sovereign and thus triggers a reciprocal power of the sovereign to assert 
authority over the individual.260 Second, and critically for our purposes, 
there is a due process interest in a fair location. As the Court explained, 
this inquiry requires an “estimate of the inconveniences which would 
result to the [defendant] from a trial away from its home”261 and that the 
location cannot be “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that a party 
unfairly is at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”262 
This second inquiry is often referred to as the “reasonableness” or 
“fairness” requirement263 and requires consideration of such factors as 
the hardship on the defendant to litigate in the forum, any obstacles to 
the presentation of relevant evidence in the forum, the substantive law 
applicable to the dispute, the availability of other more convenient 
forums, and any hardship the plaintiff would suffer in those locations.264  
When we juxtapose the two due process interests—limited sovereign 
power and fairness in location265—with the central tenets of personal 
                                                                                                                     
 258. See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 609 (plurality opinion) (“To determine whether the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process, we have long relied on the 
principles traditionally followed by American courts in marking out the territorial limits of each 
State’s authority. That criterion was first announced in Pennoyer v. Neff . . . .”). 
 259. See J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion); World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291–92, 294; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251; Fullerton, supra note 14, at 8–
9; Redish, supra note 79, at 1115–20; see also supra notes 98, 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 260. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) (plurality 
opinion) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 
U.S. at 295; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. 
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 423 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“As active participants in interstate 
and foreign commerce take advantage of the economic benefits and opportunities offered by the 
various States, . . . chief among the obligations that a nonresident corporation should expect to 
fulfill is amenability to suit in any forum that is significantly affected by the corporation’s 
commercial activities.”). 
 261. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 262. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 263. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 
U.S. 84, 92 (1978). 
 264. E.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (plurality opinion); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 
292; Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 100 
(1983); see, e.g., Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214–15 (1977); 
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223–24 (1957). 
 265. There is also a third, related due process interest: “Due process requires that the 
defendant be given adequate notice of the suit.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291; see 
also Kulko, 436 U.S. at 91 (“The existence of personal jurisdiction . . . depends upon the 
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jurisdiction and venue, the parallels are inescapable. As the Supreme 
Court explained, venue rules “safeguard against the unfairness and 
hardship involved when [a party] is prosecuted in a remote place.”266 As 
Charles Wright and Arthur Miller further explained in their seminal 
treatise, the purpose of venue rules is “to insure that litigation is lodged 
in a convenient forum and to protect [the] defendant against the 
possibility that [the] plaintiff will select an arbitrary place in which to 
bring suit.”267 In contrast, as Justice Holmes explained, the “foundation 
of [personal] jurisdiction is physical power”: the power of the forum to 
act against an individual.268 Consider how these concepts compare to 
the two due process interests as articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen: 
The concept of minimum contacts . . . can be seen to 
perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It 
protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a 
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the 
States through their courts, do not reach out beyond the 
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal 
sovereigns in a federal system.269  
The latter function the Court describes is traditionally referred to as 
personal jurisdiction, while the former is, with one notable exception, 
merely venue refashioned as personal jurisdiction.  
The notable exception is that the Court, in World-Wide Volkswagen 
and in many of its other personal jurisdiction cases, speaks of the 
“burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum”270—not a 
distant or inconvenient location. The focus on the forum is a natural 
byproduct of the personal jurisdiction framework but, as the examples 
in Part II illustrate, that focus is ill-suited in some cases to effectuate the 
stated purposes of the inquiry: the prevention of “litigation so gravely 
                                                                                                                     
presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought . . . .”). Service of 
process requirements secure this due process interest because they have their own “due process 
component” which requires “notice reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” SEC v. Ross, 
504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314 (1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Service of process is distinct from, but 
closely related to, personal jurisdiction—service of process being the mechanism by which the 
court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See supra note 135. 
 266. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958). 
 267. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 1063. 
 268. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).  
 269. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291–92. 
 270. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (emphasis added); accord J. McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 
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difficult and inconvenient that a party unfairly is at a severe 
disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”271 When the forum is the 
United States, a defendant who lives in Portland, Maine, who is sued in 
federal district court in the District of Hawaii, in Honolulu, cannot 
plausibly claim that the forum of the United States is inappropriate in 
any way, even if he never had any contact with Hawaii. But, of course, 
depending on the circumstances, the venue of Hawaii—over 8,000 
miles away from his home—may indeed be “so gravely difficult and 
inconvenient” that he is at a “severe disadvantage” in comparison to his 
opponent. 
Indeed, the tension that emerges from a focus on the fairness of the 
forum rather than the location cannot withstand logical scrutiny. 
Imagine a scenario where a Florida resident strikes an Alaska resident 
with her car while the Alaskan vacations in Miami. The Alaskan then 
returns home and files a lawsuit against the Floridian in Alaska state 
court. Imagine further that the Floridian has never been to Alaska nor 
had any contacts whatsoever with the forum, is indigent but has pro 
bono counsel who will represent her in Florida but not Alaska, and has 
no way to pay for the transportation of critical eye witnesses from 
Florida to Alaska. If the Alaska court asserted personal jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Court would undoubtedly find it unfair and unreasonable to 
require the Floridian to defend herself in Alaska, where she would be at 
a significant disadvantage, and that to do so would offend due process. 
But imagine now that the Alaskan is an employee at the Floridian’s 
mom-and-pop grocery store while visiting for the summer in Miami and 
that the suit is a Federal Labor Standards Act action for unpaid wages 
brought in federal district court in Fairbanks, Alaska. If the analysis 
focuses on the fairness of the forum of the United States, the Floridian 
defendant could not plausibly contest a suit in the forum of his 
residence (the United States) and thus a court would uphold personal 
jurisdiction. But it is simply incoherent to hold that the first scenario 
offends due process because of the grave obstacles to a fair 
adjudication, but that the very same obstacles in the second scenario fail 
to raise any due process problems. It is the definition of inconsistency to 
hold that the very same obstacles to a fair hearing would be a due 
process violation in the state case but not in the federal case, but this is 
exactly the result our current jurisprudence dictates. There is, it seems, a 
                                                                                                                     
 271. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 
1, 18 (1972) and McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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flaw in the logic.272 That flaw is the Court’s target of the reasonableness 
inquiry toward the forum rather than toward the location. 
The Supreme Court never directly grappled with this inconsistency 
and, as discussed supra at Section II.A, this logical tension triggered 
dramatically divergent approaches from various circuit courts. Some 
courts seem untroubled by the asymmetric operation of the due process 
requirement in state and federal cases: 
[T]he “fairness” standard imposed by [the Supreme Court] 
relates to the fairness of the exercise of power by a 
particular sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the 
burdens of litigating in a distant forum. . . . Here the 
sovereign is the United States, and there can be no question 
but that the defendant, a resident citizen of the United 
States, has sufficient contacts with the United States to 
support the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction over him 
by a United States court.273  
Other courts have bristled at the logical inconsistency and strained to 
apply due process standards in a universal manner: 
We discern no reason why these constitutional notions 
                                                                                                                     
 272. One could plausibly argue that the distinction lies between the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which operates against states and thus controls in the first scenario, and the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which operates against the federal government and thus 
controls in the second scenario. But the Supreme Court long ago considered and properly rejected this 
distinction. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (relying on Fourteenth Amendment 
cases to define limits of the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process protections). Professor 
Abraham eloquently noted the logical incoherence when he explained that in the state court context 
we protect a defendant against locations “considered so unfair to him as to offend the ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice’ embodied in the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Might it not also be unfair to force him to litigate in the federal court across the street?” 
Abraham, supra note 14, at 533–34.  
 273. Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Busch v. 
Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Given that the 
relevant sovereign is the United States, it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant residing within the United 
States.”); Haile v. Henderson Nat’l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 825–26 (6th Cir. 1981) (“[N]ationwide 
service of process, when authorized by Congress, is not extra-territorial at all. Therefore, the due 
process limitation on such process should be precisely the limitations applicable on a state’s 
process within its territorial limits . . . .”), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982); Driver v. Helms, 
577 F.2d 147, 156 (1st Cir. 1978) (“The United States, . . . whose court is here asserting 
jurisdiction, does not lose its sovereignty when a state’s border is crossed. The Constitution does 
not require the federal districts to follow state boundaries.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., 
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(“[P]lainly, where, as here, the defendants reside within the territorial boundaries of the United 
States, the ‘minimal contacts,’ required to justify the federal government’s exercise of power 
over them, are present.” (footnote omitted)). 
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of “fairness” and “reasonableness” . . .  should be discarded 
completely when jurisdiction is asserted under a federal 
statute rather than a state long-arm statute. The language of 
the Fifth Amendment is virtually identical to that of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and both amendments were 
designed to protect individual liberties from the same types 
of government infringement. . . . Although the fact that the 
United States is the sovereign asserting its power 
undoubtedly must affect the way the constitutional balance 
is struck, the assertion of federal power should not cause 
courts to abandon completely their role as protectors of 
individual liberty and fundamental fairness.274 
So then what explains the Court’s odd choice to tether the due 
process fairness inquiry to the forum rather than to the location of the 
proceedings in the first instance? Part of the answer surely lies in the 
fact that International Shoe, and the large majority of the Supreme 
Court’s personal jurisdiction cases, arose in the context of state long-
arm statutes where the issue was whether it was fair and reasonable to 
                                                                                                                     
 274. Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292); see 
also Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assist. Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e hold 
that in a federal question case where jurisdiction is invoked based on nationwide service of 
process, the Fifth Amendment requires the plaintiff’s choice of forum to be fair and reasonable 
to the defendant.”); Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 
1341, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 1988) (footnote omitted) (observing that the “due process clause of the 
fifth amendment constrains a federal court’s power to acquire personal jurisdiction via 
nationwide service of process” and indicating that the Fifth Amendment inquiry focuses on the 
“fairness and reasonableness” of requiring a defendant to litigate in particular forum), rev’d on 
other grounds, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Handley v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1272 
(6th Cir. 1984) (“In a case like the present one, where a federal court is sitting in a federal 
question case, the purpose of minimum contacts is to protect the defendant ‘against the burdens 
of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.’” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 
292)); Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The only constitutional 
limitation on Congressional power to provide a forum is whatever fairness is required by fifth 
amendment due process.”); Chem Lab Prods., Inc. v. Stepanek, 554 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 
1977) (holding that a defendant in a federal patent action must have minimum contacts with the 
state in which the federal court sits for the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction to comport 
with due process); Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 397 F.2d 1, 3–4 (3rd Cir. 1968) 
(holding that a defendant in a Federal Employers’ Liability Act action must have minimum 
contacts with the state in which the federal court sits for the court’s assertion of personal 
jurisdiction to meet the “basic principles of fairness” required by the Due Process Clause); Lone 
Star Package Car Co. v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954) (holding that, when 
“cases are governed by federal law, the question of whether they are to be tried in one locality or 
another is now to be tested . . . simply by basic principles of fairness”); Oxford First Corp. v. 
PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 201 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (“We reject the notion that there 
are no limitations upon extraterritorial service of process under federal statutes such as the 
securities acts; the existence of the Fifth Amendment would indicate otherwise.”). 
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require a defendant to travel from her home state to the forum state and 
defend herself from suit.275 In this way, a “fair forum” was, in these 
critical cases, a proxy for a “fair location.” Moreover, the focus on the 
fairness of the state, and the apparent lack of initial concern for the 
fairness of the location of federal proceedings, makes some sense from 
a democratic theory perspective. The due process reasonableness 
inquiry does not play the same role in federal and in state cases. The 
Court developed the reasonableness inquiry to impose some limits on 
states that may overreach in their attempts to assert jurisdiction over 
residents of other states276 who lack a political voice in the forum 
jurisdiction. In the normal federal case, this is a non-issue. Congress 
represents all United States citizens and thus should have the proper 
incentives to establish fair venue statutes to prevent plaintiffs from 
haling people into court unnecessarily across the country. Thus in the 
normal cases, perhaps, there is no need for a constitutional floor to 
venue. But, as we demonstrate, in a discrete but significant category of 
cases with politically disempowered litigants (such as cases that involve 
immigrants or foreign defendants) or where the United States is itself a 
party (such as deportation proceedings), the same dynamics necessitate 
a constitutional backstop.277 Moreover, there is nothing inconsistent 
with the recognition of the constitutional nature of venue and the 
simultaneous recognition of the political dynamics that often, but do not 
always, prevent us from falling below the constitutional floor. 
Another likely factor is the Court’s natural institutional 
incrementalism and adherence to stare decisis. Long before the Court 
recognized a due process interest in a fair and reasonable location, it 
held that there is “nothing in the Constitution which forbids Congress 
to . . . [authorize] process served anywhere in the United States” 
because the location of a federal suit “is merely a matter of legislative 
discretion.”278 To find that due process imposes a limit on permissible 
venues would have created tension with this entrenched holding. In 
contrast, Pennoyer had firmly established a due process limit on 
personal jurisdiction.279 In addition, the history of International Shoe 
reveals that the litigants never raised a due process claim as a question 
                                                                                                                     
 275. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2789–90; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105–06 (1987); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 696–700 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287; Kulko v. 
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 243 (1958); McGee, 
355 U.S. at 223; Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 276. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra Part II. 
 278. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1879). 
 279. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–36 (1878), abrogated by Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 
and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
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of venue before the Supreme Court or the courts below.280 Accordingly, 
the Courts treatment of the due process fair location inquiry through the 
lens of personal jurisdiction was a natural response to the questions 
presented and, in the context of the state cases through which the 
doctrine developed, sufficient to provide the required venue protection.  
Whatever the cause, the decision to locate due process venue 
considerations in the personal jurisdiction inquiry is inconsistent with 
the history and functions of both doctrines. In the small but significant 
class of cases where other location-protective mechanisms fail to 
operate, this error can force litigants to proceed in gravely unfair 
locations.281  
Understanding the due process inquiry in a fair location as venue 
would provide a host of benefits. First, it would better comport with the 
historic origins of both doctrines. Fairness of location is the historic 
                                                                                                                     
 280. Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping 
and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 781–817 
(recounting, at length, the history of International Shoe Co. v. Washington). This is hardly 
surprising as International Shoe Co.’s primary claim was that Washington State lacked authority 
to levy taxes against it, a foreign corporation, by virtue of the dormant commerce clause. Thus, 
the assertion of lack of sovereign authority in the personal jurisdiction argument dovetailed with 
the company’s merits position. In contrast, a win on the venue issue would only subject the 
company to the same claims in federal district court (with jurisdiction over the claim by virtue 
of diversity) in a more convenient location. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315–16. 
 281. See Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945 (“We discern 
no reason why these constitutional notions of ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’ should be 
discarded completely when jurisdiction is asserted under a federal statute rather than a state 
long-arm statute. . . . [T]he assertion of federal power should not cause courts to abandon 
completely their role as protectors of individual liberty and fundamental fairness.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292)); Chlomos v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
516 F.2d 310, 314 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1975) (vacating a deportation order upon consideration of, 
inter alia, the due process implications of holding a hearing in Florida, far from the petitioner’s 
place of residence in New Jersey); La Franca v. INS, 413 F.2d 686, 689 n.9 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(“Ordinarily the better procedure would be to hold the [deportation] hearing in the district of the 
alien’s residence or place of arrest. Obviously it should not be held in a district so far removed 
from his residence or place of arrest as to deprive him of a fair hearing.”); Lone Star Package 
Car Co. v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954) (“[When] cases are governed by 
federal law, the question of whether they are to be tried in one locality or another is now to be 
tested . . . by basic principles of fairness.”); Seren, 15 I. & N. Dec. 590, 591 (B.I.A. 1976) 
(“Matters involving procedural due process in a hearing before an immigration judge, are under 
his jurisdiction. Venue is, of course, such a matter.”); see also Brecheen v. Oklahoma, 485 U.S. 
909, 910 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court “has established that a 
refusal to grant a motion for change of venue may constitute a violation of due process”). But 
see, e.g., Lovell v. INS, 52 F.3d 458, 461 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the immigration “change-
of-venue regulation does not reflect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or 
Federal law”); Aquilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, 490 F. Supp. 2d 42, 48 (D. 
Mass.) (“[T]he court [is not] aware of[] any constitutional right to have a removal hearing held 
in a specific venue.”), aff’d, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).  
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core of venue. While this is closely related in effect, it is doctrinally 
distinct from the jurisdictional issues of the fairness of being subjected 
to the authority of the sovereign. Second, recognition of the 
constitutional dimension of venue would help harmonize the Supreme 
Court’s confused personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and allow those 
Justices who see fairness in location as unrelated to jurisdiction to find 
peace with those Justices who see fairness in location as a central due 
process consideration. If they extracted fairness in location from the 
personal jurisdiction inquiry and placed it in a venue inquiry, this could 
satisfy both camps. Moreover, recognition of the due process floor of 
venue will eliminate the logical inconsistency that can now arise where 
the very same grave obstacles to a fair hearing can, under current 
doctrine, be recognized as a due process violation in state cases but not 
in certain federal cases. Finally, and most critically, recognition of the 
constitutional boundaries of venue will ensure a most basic measure of 
due process for thousands of poor litigants each year who must now 
defend themselves in the most consequential of proceedings, thousands 
of miles away from their homes, in locations where they have often face 
insurmountable obstacles to a fair hearing.282 
CONCLUSION 
Modern phenomena—advancements in communication technologies, 
innovative business relationships, and globalization—continue to facilitate 
long-distance interaction and bring us ever closer together, even as we 
remain geographically distant. In response, the Supreme Court’s 
conception of personal jurisdiction appropriately adapts to the efforts of 
courts to exert jurisdiction over far-off defendants. In so doing, 
however, the Court conflates the distinct due process interests that 
historically underlie limits on personal jurisdictions with those that 
underlie venue. The Court’s abandonment of the foundational 
understanding of venue and personal jurisdiction muddles Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and split circuits. Worse still, when the Court 
subsumes the due process interest in a fair location for trial within the 
personal jurisdiction inquiry, the Court leaves some defendants with no 
protections whatsoever. The time has come to recognize that venue 
indeed has a constitutional floor. 
                                                                                                                     
 282. See supra Section II.A. Delineating the exact substance of the constitutional venue 
inquiry is beyond the scope of this project. However, insofar as we argue that the current 
“reasonableness” question in the personal jurisdiction context is, in fact, a venue inquiry 
miscognized, it is a natural starting point for an analysis of the constitutionality of venue 
choices.  
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